

The Problem of Personality in the Social World

Alfred Schutz

**The Problem of Personality in the Social World
1936, 1937**

By Alfred Schutz

**Translated from the German as edited with introduction and notes by Martin
Endress and Ilja Srubar by Fred Kersten**

Translators' Preface

Of the translation of the Bible he commissioned, King James said that “it was loved in its doing, beautifully done, to be cherished forever.” This translation of two manuscripts of Alfred Schutz’s “The Problem of Personality in the Social World” was certainly “loved in its doing.” Whether it is “beautifully done,” or whether it will be “cherished forever,” are not questions to be decided by the translators.

Translations, of course, are never finished. They are always ongoing for each generation of readers which has its own “doing”. It is appropriate, then, that the translators of the present work remain anonymous, leaving room for other generations, other “doings.”

Alfred Schutz wrote the two manuscripts in the Summers of 1936 and 1937. The translation is made from the manuscripts *as edited and published* in Alfred Schutz, *Werkausgabe*, Volume V.I, *Theorie der Lebenswelt*, edited by Martin Endress and Ilja Srubar, Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003.¹ It has not been the purpose of the translators, however, to provide in English a variorum or critical edition of the German original of Schutz, which was the task of the German editors. Instead it was the task of the translators to provide a complete reading, and readable text in English of Schutz’s 1936 and 1937 manuscripts.

¹ The general editors of the *Werkausgabe* are Richard Grathoff, Hans-Georg Soeffner and Ilja Srubar, and is to be published in 9 volumes (12 half-volumes). The edition was to be completed in 2008.

The two manuscripts are quite different in tone, style, and content. The 1936 manuscript was written by Schutz chiefly for himself and provides us with a valuable glimpse into Schutz at work in the seclusion of his workshop. Consisting of notes, outlines, lists of topics to be studied, and ideas to be developed under their headings, it seeks the eventual arrangement of it all into a systematic order of inquiry. By the end of the manuscript he seems to have been able to pick up where he left off in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* some 4 years earlier and to successfully incorporate into the train of his thought much of the reading and thinking he had done since then.

In contrast, the 1937 manuscript, with that of the previous summer in mind, tentative though it is, is written for, and already invites, a readership of scientific literature. Accordingly, the tone and style are quite different. It is a first draft, we may say, of the thought developed and presentable to others rather than just to Schutz himself. We begin to see the shape of the finished product emerge and, in places, start to take on a life of its own. The 1937 manuscript, then, is much more than simply the process of filling in the outlines and sketches of the 1936 manuscript.

Yet despite the difference in content, tone, and orientation of the manuscripts, they belong together. The 1936 manuscript launches the line of thought of the 1937 manuscript. Both manuscripts are unfinished, but in different ways. The first is unfinished in the sense that Schutz had left himself with incomplete sketches of topics, outlines, and the placement of material. Otherwise it is finished in the sense that he had now laid out the task he had set for himself. Apart from internal evidence and the fragmentary form of the manuscript, there is the fact that the second is unfinished in a different way: Schutz ran out of time to complete the writing of it, perhaps due to the circumstances that affected his life at the time. He only came back to the material of the second manuscript in the late 1940's and the early 1950's, when he used some of it for essays published for specific occasions. By the late 1950's he had already moved onto a new and more ambitious project, the *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*.

A few remarks are in order concerning the translation. Page numbers in bold face in square brackets are the numbers, first, of Schutz's original manuscript, and second of the archival pagination. Thus [1/7103] = p. 1 of Schutz's original 1937 manuscript; and p. 7103 the archival page number. *All internal references are to this pagination in bold face.* Most of the indented paragraphs in the original manuscript are set off by one or more vertical lines. Unless otherwise indicated, all the footnotes are translations or adaptations of those of the editors of the German edition. However, some footnotes of the German edition have been shortened or omitted because deemed not relevant to the text in English. Still other footnotes have been added relevant to the text in English.

Where they are available to the translators, references to the English editions of works cited in the editors' footnotes have been added. In many cases, only the original work is cited, and in such a way that reference to an English translation can easily be made. For instance, *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §47, is the same section in its English translation, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. In other cases the pagination of the original language edition is found in the margins of the English translation. For instance, the pagination of the German text of Husserl's *Formale*

und transzendente Logik is found in the margin of the English translation, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Or, in the case of manuscripts in German, such as “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur,” only the manuscript pages are referred to because they are found in the margin of both the German edition and the English translation, *Life Forms and Meaning Structure*. Where such citation is not possible, the pagination of English translations, or their editions, where available, has also been given. Unpublished archival material of Alfred Schutz is referred to by archival numbers.

As a rule, only the original title of a work is given in the footnotes and in the bibliography where any edition of a text will do. Thus, for example, the dialogues of Plato referred to in the notes are simply listed in the bibliography. On the other hand, where specific editions are referred to in the notes, they are listed in full. In cases where the editors cite German translations of works in other languages, possible equivalent translations in English are substituted. Thus, for instance, the works of Bergson are referred to in the English, rather than the German, translations.

The full title of works cited is given only the first time, shortened or abbreviated titles thereafter. For reference, a bibliography of works cited is included. In addition, there are a few abbreviations. For instance, the volumes of Schutz’s *Collected Papers* are abbreviated *CP I*, or *CPII*, or *CP III*, or *CPIV*.

In some cases of the translation, the translators have tried to preserve Schutz’s later English expression of his thought. Thus “finite provinces of meaning” for “*geschlossener Sinnstruktur*,” “self” for “*Ich*,” “probability” (or “likelihood”) for “*Chance*” and so forth. For the most part, Latin and Greek words and phrases are left as Schutz used them in his text, their meanings being obvious to readers accustomed to scientific literature. For purposes of reference, a glossary of Greek and Latin terms is included. Occasionally the translators have sought to smooth the rather telegraphic nature of some parts of the manuscripts to make them more readable for a general public. Very long paragraphs and sentences have, on occasion, been broken up into shorter ones. As a result, some sentences and paragraphs, while expressing Schutz’s thought, we believe, are not Schutz’s. Finally, glosses of the German editors, or German words in the original text, are in plain, square brackets, []; glosses of the translators are either in angle brackets, < >, or in smart brackets, { }

Where there are questions about the translation and the text, the reader is referred to the edited German original. For the genesis of the original text, and for the means by which it was assembled and edited, the reader is referred to the Editors’ Introduction to the German edition of Volume V.I of the *Werkausgabe*. We wish to note here two brief, but very fine, introductions in English to the two manuscripts translated, and on which the translators have relied. The first is by Helmut R. Wagner, in *Alfred Schutz. An Intellectual Biography*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 52 ff.; and the second by Michael D. Barber, in *The Participating Citizen. A Biography of Alfred Schutz*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 63 ff. The translators also wish to express their gratitude to the editors of the German edition for making it available in advance of publication, and to Professor Lester E. Embree for his help, patience and encouragement of the translation.

Some years before his untimely death, Helmut Wagner collated the 1936 and 1937 manuscripts with the intention of carving out a “complete,” coherent text expressing Schutz’s views on the problem of personality. His project was left unfinished, however, and had not progressed sufficiently for it to be completed by others. It is fitting, accordingly, that the translators dedicate this translation of Alfred Schutz to the memory of Helmut Wagner. Perhaps more than anyone else, Wagner’s work on Schutz “was loved in its doing.”

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

IN THE SOCIAL WORLD

1936

a[I. 7060]

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

IN THE SOCIAL WORLD

<1936>

Introduction

- I. General Account of the Unity of the Person.
- II. The Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self.²
- III. The Social Person and the Thou-problem
- IV. The Social *Individuum* and the Social *Collectivum*.

²In this text Schutz follows the general “architecture” of all of his writings by beginning with the “solitary self,” or with the description of phenomena from the perspective of the single person in order to proceed to sociality. He is well aware that even the “world of the solitary self” is already constituted and structured intersubjectively. This conscious abstraction of his egological formulation is explicitly stated by Schutz in the Introduction to the manuscript on “The Problem of Personality” of 1937: “Accordingly, we have to carry out painstaking investigations of the world of the solitary self, of its nature, of the problems comprised under the heading of personality, and of the forms of self-consciousness. <Those investigations have to be carried out, moreover,> before we can enter into further and difficult questions about which modifications and consequences arise such that the conception of a solitary self is only an arbitrary abstraction, that the self in the world always presupposes being with others and that these other alter egos are human beings like me whose self in its being in the world shows a world that is natural like mine and in principle of the same constitution as my own self.” (22/7126). Cf. also the references to the problem in the present draft, pp. 14/7083 and 15/7084 as well as in the first version of 1937, p. 82/7173. See also the corresponding indications in the published essay, “On Multiple Realities,” *Collected Papers*, Volume I, Edited and Introduced, by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 208 f. [(hereinafter *CP I*)] as well as the observation of Schutz in his letter to Aron Gurwitsch of 20 April, 1952; [see *Philosophers In Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1939–1959*. Edited by Richard Grathoff. Translated by J. Claude Evans. Foreword by Maurice Natanson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 175 ff.]

V. Methodological Consequences.

VI. The Problem of Personality and the Praxis of the Social Sciences. Conclusion:
The Prospect of a Universal Theory of Relevance.³

Weitlaubrunn, July 28, 1936

[II/7061]

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Introduction (A/7063)

- A. Summary of the Chief Results of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau* [A/7063]
- B. On the Necessity of the Philosophical Foundation of the Problems of the Social Personality [A/7063]
- C. Account of the Problem of Foundation [B/7064]
- D. On the Practical Consequences of a Full-fledged Theory of Personality in the Social World for Problems of the Object and Method of the Social Sciences in general [B/7064]
- E. The Plan of the Book (The Course of Further Investigation) [B/7064].
 - I. The General Account of the Problem of the Unity of the Person [1/7065]
 - a) Delimitation of the self from the *alter ego* [1/7065]
 - 1) Problem of the social person as the problem of activity and passivity
 - 2) *Cogitare* and *agere*
 - 3) Mnemonic paradoxes
 - 4) Paralogsms of attention
 - 5) On the unity of monads and the entelechy of the *ego agens*.
 - b) The role of the body [3/7067]
 - c) On the *me ipsum* that belongs to the facts of consciousness [5/7069]
 - d) On the most personal facts of consciousness pertaining to the *alter ego*. [5/7069]
 - e) On the difference of my experiencing of thou and of my social person [5/7069]
 - [f] Transition to Chapter II: Simile of counterpoint] [6/7070]
 - II. Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self [6a/7070]

³ The consequences for a “universal theory of relevance” resulting from the treatment of problems of personality are more fully suggested by Schutz in his manuscripts from 1947 and 1951 such as the posthumously published *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by Richard M. Zaner, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. This work was reprinted in *Collected Papers V*. Schutz had already emphasized the necessity for developing a theory of relevance at the end of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, 1931. (English translation with an Introduction by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 1967), §50.

⁴ Departing from our editorial principles of chronological order, these pages are placed here as a better “table of contents.” Schutz had placed them at the end of his phase of work in 1936. We retain his page numbering.

- A. General positing of the *ego ipse* and its modifications in the natural world-view [6 a/7071]
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 - IV. The *ego agens* and the hierarchy of projects [10/7078] [III./7062]
- C. Problems of pragmatic interpretation [11/7079]
 - 1. Primacy of the acting self [11/7079]
 - [a)] *Physis*
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 - 2. Centering of all other personalities around the *ego agens* [11/7079]
 - 3. Further investigations of the pragmatic principle [12/7080]
 - 4. The pragmatic principle as constituent of forms of personality conceived as co-existing or as co-succeeding. [15/7084]
 - a) Primacy of the pragma in the vivid present [*reinen aktuellen Pragmas*] and the full reality constituted by it. (15/7084)
 - b) Modifications of the world of working [*Wirklichkeit*]⁵ by means of alterations in the *attention à la vie* [16/7085]
 - 1. Preface
 - 2. The world of phantasy
 - 3. The world of dreams
 - 4. The theoretical world of contemplative observation
 - (c) Summary [20/7089]
- D. Central and peripheral levels of the person. [21/7090]
 - 1. Emergence of the self as subject of the different forms of the self as phenomenon [21/7090]
 - 2. Theory of the intimate person [21/7090]

⁵By “world of working” Schutz denotes the daily world in which we work and operate, into which we are geared, and for which we are pragmatically geared to bring about changes and effects, and in which we affectively deal with others in social action. Thus in addition to a narrower meaning distinguishing it from the surrounding world, “world of working” has a very broad meaning of a sort that makes it difficult to find a single equivalent in English. It also has the connotation of a world in which things and events happen “naturally” as well. And, as Helmut Wagner once noted, in his later writings in English, Schutz himself simply used the term, “world of working,” to comprise this very broad meaning and to express the etymological proximity of “*wirken*” and “*werken*.” See, for instance, “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, pp. 211 f.}.

3. Proximity of levels belonging to the intimate person [22/7091]
 - a) The vital sphere.
 - b) Sexuality.
 4. The *ego cogitans* and the *ego agens* [22/7091]
 5. Incorporation of the external world [22/7091]
 6. The full development of the process of anonymization in the social world [23/7092]
- E. Actuality of personal levels and of their variations. [24/7093]
1. Active and passive attention as the phenomena constituting the actuality of the personal levels [24/7093]
 2. "Secularization" of attention in daily life [24/7093]
 3. Constancy and change of attention à la vie (phenomena of transition)—the origin of morality [25/7094]
 4. Conflicts of interest and their resolution. [26/7095]
 5. Application of these viewpoints to the problems of culture in general and its history. [26/7095]
- F. Summary of the results of the foregoing investigation. [26/7095]

Weitlaubrunn, 21/22 August 1936

III. Social Person and You-Problem

[A/7063] **Introduction**⁶

A. Summary presentation of the chief results of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*.

- a) Starting from the full givenness of the *alter ego* in the surrounding world we proceed to the *alter ego* in the contemporary world, then to the types of the greatest anonymity and least fullness of content.
- b) Starting from subjective meaning, from the individuality of the self, referring to its division into social persons (into the self *qua pater familias*, into the self *qua civis Romanus*, etc.)
- c) Starting from the general positing of the *alter ego* in which its division into social persons is co-positd.
- d) Starting from the social relationship: Between which social persons does it occur?
- e) Starting from social formations of a higher order: What makes up this unification? To what extent do they function as regulative for the in-order-to-motives and the because-motives?
- f) Starting from the problems of method in the social sciences: Which social persons are present to the observer? Why are "rational ideal types" privileged? Which social persons are typifiable? Which enjoy an "environment of relevance" [*Relevanzumgebung*] by virtue of the fundamental line of inquiry (conditioned by the choice of types) a) in the social sciences generally, and b) in individual social sciences?

⁶The beginning of the idea for an Introduction that follows was developed in a first version in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937; cf. below, pp. 1/703-29/7133.

B. On the necessity of a philosophical foundation of the problem of social personality.⁷

The unity of consciousness—self-consciousness—
 my self now and my self before—my self tomorrow—
 On this substratum, the emergence of personality
 —as the fulcrum of ethical accountability (Scheler)
 —as theological (creature) (Kierkegaard)
 —applied Platonically, as the fulcrum of accountability of *anamnesis*
 —Spinoza
 —Leibniz's monadology
 —Kant's theory of the consciousness of the ego "that must be able to accompany"
 all thinking.
 —Fichte's ego and non-ego
 —Husserl's primordial, transcendental and phenomenologizing ego
 —Bergson's conception of the constituting of the self by the duration [*durée*]⁸

Problems of any anthropology which will be able to come forth as science—

More recent investigations.⁹

⁷The divisions among arrangements of catchwords and references in sections B), C), and D) of the Table of Contents are added by the editors. In the original manuscript they are numbered consecutively.

⁸In this connection, see Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus* (1913/16), in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 2, edited by Maria Scheler/Manfred Frings, Bern/München, 1980, especially pp. 469ff, 477ff; {English translation by Manfred Frings and Roger L. Funk, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values*, pp. 459 ff., 467 ff.;} Søren Kierkegaard, *Die Krankheit zum Tode. Eine christlich-psychologische Entwicklung zur Erbauung und Enveklung van Anti-Climacus* (1849), *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by Emanuel Hirsch, Gutersloh: Mohn, 1992, esp. Part II, A, Chapter 1 (*The Sickness Unto Death*, translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941); Plato, *Phaedrus*, 72e ff.; Spinoza, *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (1677); Leibniz, *Monadologie* (1714); Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87), especially B 131 ff.; (English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1953, pp. 153ff.); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, Part I, §§1-3; (edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970, pp. 93 ff.); Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913), *Husserliana* III/1; (English translation by Fred Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (1931), *Husserliana* I, §§8 ff., 30 ff., 55; (English translation by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889), Chapter 2; (Authorized translation by F.L. Pogson, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960 [1910], *Time and Free Will*, pp. 75 ff.); Cf. below, p. 21/7124.

⁹For the general discussion of the anthropological literature up to the middle 1930s, see especially the following: Max Scheler, *Die Idee des Menschen* (1914) and *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928) (English translation with an Introduction, by Hans Meyerhoff, New York: The Noonday Press, 1961); Helmut Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1928) as well as *Macht und menschliche Natur* (1931); Otto Schwarz, *Medizinische Anthropologie* (1929); Karl Löwith, *Die Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* (1928); Joachim Wach, *Typen religiöser Anthropologie* (1932); Albert Huth, *Abriss der pädagogischen Anthropologie* (1932); Paul Ludwig Landsberg, *Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1934); Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Das neue Bild des Menschen und die anthropologische Aufgabe* (1934); Georg Kuhlmann, *Theologische Anthropologie* (1935).

[B/7064]

C. [Development of the Fundamental Problem]¹⁰

The fundamental problem is not how the social person arises—for the social person is *pros hemas*—but instead how the unity of the person is clarified as the unitary *hypokeimenon* founding all social articulation of the person belonging to the self. Above all, whether the person is *constituted* by a demonstrable production of intentionality—and, if so, whose? Only an assurance about this starting point can make an analysis of the social person fruitful—let alone make it possible.

D. On the practical consequences of a fullfledged theory of the personality in the social world for the problems of the object and method in the social sciences in general.

References of importance for specific problems:

Homo oeconomicus and *zoonpolitikon*, but also:

Entrepreneur, consumer—producer; prosecutor—accused; media [*Organ*]; charismatic figure (leader—follower); public opinion;

the meaning of a true theory of association and education;

the meaning of Sombart's "three national economies;"¹¹

consequences for the problems of history;

"the great man;"¹² and

problems of style in art:

the Gothic man with his reflective sense of building; the "true pianist" of Carl Philip Emmanuel Bach, etc., etc. (philological situation: drama and audience); universal theory of art; problems of the theory of form,¹³

but also applied to philosophy itself: *homo mathematicus*;

the *human* being in physics and the observer;

¹⁰ Added from the Table of Contents; see above, p. 11/7061.

¹¹ For Leopold von Wiese's so-called theory of relations of working of, see especially *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie* (1924–28), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,³ 1955, as well as Werner Sombart, *Die Drei Nationalökonomien. Geschichte und System der Lehre von der Wirtschaft*, München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1930.

¹² In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp.494 ff., 505 ff. {English translation, pp. 485f,495 f.}

¹³ See Hermann Schmitz, *Die Gotik im deutschen Kunst- und Geistesleben*, Berlin: Verlag für Kunstwissenschaft, 1921; Heinrich G. Lempertz, *Wesen der Gotik*, Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1926. For J.S. Bach's son, Carl Philipp Emanuel, see the latter's *Versuch itber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, published in two parts, Berlin 1753 or 1762, later Leipzig: Schwickert,³ 1780 or 1797. For the discussion of the problem of style in art, see Max Dvorak, *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*, Berlin: Oldenbourg 1908; (English translation with Notes and Bibliography by Randolph I. Klawiter. Preface by Karl Maria Swoboda. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967); and the same author's *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*, München: Piper, 1924. This last volume is in Schutz's private library. "Style" turned out to be one of the great themes in the 1920's; cf. especially Carl E. Osthaus, *Grundzüge der Stilentwicklung*, Hagen: Folkwang, 1919.

Pierre et Paul, “Le voyage en boulet” [“The Journey in the Projectile”]¹⁴
(Bergson).

the *human* being in biology;

the *human* being in philosophy;

the great turning to “disinterestedness” (Husserl’s Prague lectures).¹⁵

E. Plan of the book (the [further]¹⁶ course of the investigation).

Weitlaubrunn, 7/28/1936

[1/7065]

CHAPTER ONE

General Exposition of the Problems

Of the Unity of Person

According to Leibniz’s fully developed principle of continuity,¹⁷ the series going from the highest level of anonymity in the world of contemporaries to the intimate, immediate having of itself belonging to the *alter ego* in the surrounding world must also be continued within the sphere of the self. Scheler’s theory of the relative and absolute intimate person (the person-center with peripheral levels of personality) is only a first step in this direction.¹⁸ A whole series of levels of problems immediately arise:

A) Delimitation of the self with respect to the *alter ego*.

Leibniz: “Die Erfahrung, dass wir etwas Besonderes für uns sind, das denkt, Selbstbewusstsein hat und will, und dass wir von einem anderen, der etwas anderes

¹⁴ The reference is to Henri Bergson, *Durée et Simultanéité. A Propos de la théorie d’Einstein*. 4th ed., Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1929. The 4th edition is basically the same as the 2nd edition which differs from the first by containing the three appendices added to the second, and which are reproduced in the fourth edition. Schutz’s reference is to the first appendix, “The Journey in the Projectile” (see English translation by Leon Jacobson, The Library of Liberal Arts (Bobbs-Merrill Co) Indianapolis, 1965, pp. 163–172, pp. 174 f.) Bergson’s paradox of the separation and reuniting of Peter and Paul contains the physical refutation of the theory of relativity in terms of what is called “The Clock Paradox,” and the problem of “asymmetrical aging.” Do we age together simultaneously, the “same,” or asymmetrically? See also Schutz’s reference in “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” *CP* II, p. 139.

¹⁵ See Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* (1936), in *Husserliana*, Bd VI, hg. Walter Biemel, Den Haag: Nijhoff² 1962, §§1–27; (English translation by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.) Husserl gave several lectures at the Deutschen und der Tschechischen Universität in Prague in middle of November, 1935. With their friend Felix Kaufmann, Use and Alfred Schutz attended these lectures. See Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p. 468 ff.

¹⁶ Addition based on the Table of Contents, above, 11/7061.

¹⁷ For the texts of Leibniz referred to by Schutz, see Leibniz, *Philosophische Werke*, edited by Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1903 [1966]), Vol I. Chapter VIII, pp. 84–93; Vol. II, Chapter XXII, pp. 74–78.

¹⁸ In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 533 ff.)

denkt, etwas anderes will, verschieden sind”[“For us what is quite peculiar is the experiencing that thinks, that has self-consciousness and will, and that we distinguish from another who thinks something different, who wills something different”] (Vol. II, “Die Lehre von einem einigen, allumfassenden Geistes,” p. 60). (There we find the important citations of “action of matter” and, p. 61, of the “active principles” and the mutually contrasting kinds of doings and sufferings which cannot be ascribed to one and the same subject.)¹⁹ Spinoza’s pantheism²⁰ and Bayle’s objections.²¹

The true meaning of Averroes’ *intellectus agens* and *intellectus patiens*.²²

1) The problem of the social person (in the self) as the problem of activity and passivity.

a) of the pure *cogitare*

b) [of the pure]²³ *agere*

In the *cogitatio* directed to it, the *alter ego* is a self with the distinct modification of “*aliud cogitans, aliud volens, aliud agens*.” It is further included in the heterogeneous (!) course of duration.²⁴ A general positing “of my **acting** self”²⁵ corresponds to the general positing of the *alter ego* (which is a general positing of the *alter ego cogitans*). This is the origin of the pure pragma.

[Its relationship to duration is a problem that requires a very sophisticated and subtle phenomenological investigation. The key to the problem is that the self founded in duration *acts* in the external world and accordingly gears into world-time. *Actio* as a series of experiencings in duration, *actio* as working (pragma) in world-time. Here, in this split of temporality, we already find the original experiencing of the social person.]

The “self *per se*” is a *pragmatic* unification: *ego agens et semper idem agens (volens)*. In this context, *agens as self* contains as well, to be sure, the relevant index to the social person (*ego qua pater familias, qua civis Romanus, (N)philosophus, etc.*). As a consequence, all of these modifications are shown to be precisely modifications

¹⁹ The text in parentheses is in square brackets in the original mss, after which Schutz refers to Leibniz, *op. cit.*, Vol II, Chapter XX, pp. 48–62. (The German editors cite the full text referred to by Schutz, and which is omitted here.)

²⁰ In the original Schutz uses the neologism, “Panentheismus.”

²¹ For Spinoza, see *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (1677); for Pierre Bayle, see his essay “Averroes” and “Spinoza” in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1695/97). (English translation of the entry on Spinoza in Bayle, *Historical and Critical Dictionary. Selections*. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by Richard H. Popkin. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965, pp. 288–338.) Spinoza, Bayle, and Averroes are mentioned in the text of Leibniz, *be. cit.*, “Betrachtungen über die Lehre von einem einigen, allumfassenden Geistes,” pp. 48 ff., especially p. 60, note 322.

²² See Averroes (Averrois Cordubensis, 1126–1198), *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros* (1562); edited by F. Stuart Grawford in *Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem*, Vol. VI, Cambridge/Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1953, especially pp. 409ff, 576.

²³ In the original, ditto marks for the same expression.

²⁴ Cf. Bergson’s distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous time in *Time and Free Will*, pp. 95ff, 109 ff.

²⁵ See below, p. 12/7080, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of action.”

of the one *ego ipse agens* (volens) (appearing in the general positing of the *ego agens* as *origo* of pure pragma). In other words, the “self-consciousness” of the *ego agens* is made evident in the domain of pure activity (spontaneity) [2/7066] as *idem volens*, *agens* and also *cogitans*. Here we first view the attitude of the *ego cogitans* (thus prior to executing the general positing of the *ego agens*) in the domain of pure passivity which leads to the phenomenological finding of a multiplicity of social persons that, (somewhat like electrons around the atomic nucleus) “revolve” around a “nucleus of the self (of the intimate person? of the transcendental or even phenomenologizing ego? of the enduring self with a demonstrably homogeneous (!) structure of duration?)”

However—and this is the first thing to note—all of these social persons do not belong to an *alter ego*. Instead, as modifications of my *ego ipse* they refer back to my “primordially” as modifications of my own *cogitare* (the origin of Husserl’s antithesis of noema-noesis is particularly fruitful here).²⁶ With respect to their genesis, however, these modifications are open to question, and the constituting production of their intentionalities will have to be capable of demonstration. To each of these modifications there now corresponds a specific *attention à la vie* that is describable in some manner or other. More about this later on.

2) [*cogitare* and *agere*]²⁷

Immediately we are faced with significant difficulties: First of all, every *cogitare* is also an *agere* and therefore cannot belong to pure passivity. (Not because Kant’s represented dollars are equivalent to actual dollars,²⁸ but because the action is preorganized in its project and the *spontaneity* of being able to project action is uniquely rooted in *cogitare*. —Even here it would seem that the important category of “fiat” intrudes, evaded as much by the *Sinnhafte Aufbau* as by all of phenomenology.)²⁹ We might say to this objection that, just to the extent that *cogitare* is spontaneity, namely, noesis, the unity of the *ego agens qua cogitans* is accepted as unchanged—just this

²⁶ See Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* [1912] Neu herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, §§87-96. {Hereinafter, *Ideen*, I.}

²⁷ Added on the basis of the table of contents; see above, p. II./7061.

²⁸ See Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87), B. 627. Kant of course speaks of “*Talem*.”

²⁹ Presumably Schutz borrowed this concept from William James; see James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), Vol. II, Chapter XXVI. Schutz had already referred to James’ category in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* (§11). The concept also arises in Bergson; cf. *Matière et Memoire* [*Matter and Memory*, Authorized translation by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1908) New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, p. 180.] See also Max Scheler, “Die Formen des Wissens und the Bildung” (1929); in Schutz’s copy of this essay the concept is emphatically underlined. See also the continuation in the 1937 manuscript, below pp. 69/7160-73/7164, as well as the distinction between inner deed (thinking) and external deed (working) in *Sinnhaften Aufbau*, §§8 ff., and the corresponding development by Thomas Luckmann in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* II, Frankfurt am Main: Ausgabe Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, Chapter V. This latter work has been translated as *Structures of the Life-World*, vol. 2, translated by David Parent and Richard Zaner (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1983).

makes possible the general positing of the self in the first place as transcendental or phenomenologizing *ego*.³⁰ Moreover, we have to show that activity and passivity are only helpful constructions required by the exchange of the two levels of time (prior to the position of the general positing of the acting self): in pure duration I, myself, am taken up unchanged at a stage in which the *ego agens* is already geared into world-time, or, geared into world-time, after the position of the general positing the self is projected back into a stage in which the series of experiences of action was a series of *cogitationes* immanent to the duration (free of working). Again, we find here the double play of *attention à la vie* as regulative of the general positing.³¹

3) [Mnemonic paradoxes]³²

Belonging here are the different paradoxes of memory: e.g., Is the general positing of the acting self conditioned by the simultaneity of the different [3/7067] social persons—would they all be posited as present or at least be co-present as “open horizons,”³³ or do they remain preserved as a succession, in part, of retained, in part of reproduced, “mnemoic data” belonging to this person? Here we have to add the theory of essentially actual experiencings³⁴ that are to fulfill a major part of the new system—they alone make possible at all, in the first place, the general positing or “constitution” of the transcendental ego. In this connection, cf. Leibniz’s theory of the great number of like and mutually equal *petites perceptions* that cannot be remembered (Cassirer ed., II, pp. 56f, also p. 59).

4) [Paralogisms of Attention]³⁵

We come next to the paralogisms of attention (*attention à la vie*). I am simply living straightforwardly in the stream <of my experiencings,> but directed to my working in world-time, acting as a unity without explicitly carrying out the general positing. Indeed, I cannot even effect that positing. However, if I do carry out the general positing, then my *attention à la vie* is a changed one, and, more particularly, of a diminished tension no longer allowing for working in the external world. (Perhaps here we immediately find the basic reason for Bergson’s distinction

³⁰ In contrast to the manuscripts of the 1920’s, here the difference between self and *alter ego* results not only from the essential non-identity of two *durees*, but also from the experience of belongingness of acts to me.

³¹ In this connection see Schutz’s early allusion to the “symbolic function of the acting self,” i.e., to the conception of the symbolic relation and its meaning-constituting aspects, in “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (1927), pp. 25 ff., 46ff, 129 ff. (*Life Forms and Meaning Structure*, translated, Introduced and Annotated by Helmut Wagner, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982; after 1982; reprinted in Alfred Schutz, *Literature and Literary Relationships* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 33ff. 52ff., 125ff..) The pagination of the original manuscript is found in the margins of the English translation. Henceforth, the German edition will be referenced, with the pagination of the original manuscript.

³² Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. 11/7061.

³³ In the original this insertion is enclosed by vertical lines.

³⁴ Schutz first introduced the concept of essentially actual experiencings in *Sinnhaften Aufbau*, §7.

³⁵ Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. II./7061.

between instinct and intellect.³⁶) To no less extent the lines of relevance must allow of being shown. In a certain way they are equal hypsographical contour lines of relevance [*Isohypsen*] of the *attention à la vie* that then define the relief of the landscape of the sociological persons centered around the pole of the self.³⁷ And even the genesis of these lines of relevance have to be heeded as to their constitution. This problem is of significant practical importance for a description of the concrete problems such as those of a topology of the types of social person.

5) On the unity of monads and the attendant entelechy of the *ego agens* and *cogitans* (More precise considerations can follow only on the basis of further studies of Leibniz.)³⁸

B) [The role of the body]³⁹

The role of the unity of body in the set of problems of the self and *alter ego*. In the primordial sphere my body is made evident as a unity and in contradistinction to the *alter ego*.⁴⁰

- 1) as pole of the *hic*, where thy body remains a pole of the *illic*.
- 2) consciousness of boundaries of my body that can accompany all my acting.⁴¹
- 3) my body as in motion governed by me (motor) and as organ of perception (*kat' exochen*) according to which all perceptions bear the index "my perceptions."⁴²
[4/7068]
- 4) my body as the gate into world-temporality, namely, as utensil of my—and always only my—working.

³⁶ See Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911, pp. 137 ff.

³⁷ Here Schutz puns on Leibniz's image of "veins in marble; see the subsequent note to 11/7079 below. The cartographical concept of "isohypses" or "hypsographical contour lines of relevance." *Isohypsen* is introduced by Schutz in his published work for the first time in "The Stranger," in Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Volume II, Edited and Introduced by Arvid Brodersen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 93. The expression, "pole of the self," is Husserl's in the heading of *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §31: "*Das Ich als identischer Pol der Erlebnisse*."

³⁸ This reference is a further indication of the meaning Schutz ascribed to his Leibniz studies begun shortly after finishing the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*. In this connection also see the example within the frame of the continuation of work on this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below p. 47/7138.

³⁹ Addition on the basis of the Table of Contents, above p. II./7061. This section of the first chapter was developed in a first draft in the following Summer of 1937.

⁴⁰ See Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§50ff

⁴¹ In the original the subdivisions 1) and 2) are grouped together with a bracket in the left margin of the page under the concept of "space constitution." In that connection see *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §20, 114, note 1 with the reference to *Cartesianische Meditationen*, pp. 151 f. Also see the letter of Aron Gurwitsch to Schutz of 27 July, 1950 (*Correspondence*, pp. 116 ff.)

⁴² In this connection see Schutz's earlier study, "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur," pp. 19 ff, 88 ff., 113 ff., as well as Husserl, *op. cit.*, especially §53.

- 5) my body as spatial experience from within and from without and thereby of the irruption into the domain of the extended to which alone thy body belongs, and, more particularly, does so from the beginning.⁴³
- 6) my body as the *origo* of the system of coordinates that defines the surrounding world and world of contemporaries—inanimate, animate and social.
- 7) my body as the object of my growing old.

C) On the facts of consciousness belonging to the *me ipsum*

- 1) The unity of consciousness interrupted by enclaves:
 - a) Sleep
 - b) Dreams
 - c) Phantasy (play, children's play)
 - d) Day World, Night World
 - e) The world of jokes [Witzwelt]

n.b. Excursus concerning mental illnesses, in particular studies about schizophrenia.⁴⁴
- 2) a) My growing older as the most personal, fundamental experiencing
 - b) My being toward death.⁴⁵
 - c) my partial dying (sinking away of childhood, etc.)

n.b. Excursus on somatic ageing, and returning to b) in the light of problems recognized there (letter to Landsberg)⁴⁶
- 3) The basic ethical (religious) problems *my* sins, *my* penitence, *my* anxiety, *my* moment, *my* repetition: all in Kierkegaard's sense.
- 4) The basic somatic facts

my pain, *my* sensual pleasure, *my* heartbeat, *my* digestion, *my* sexual impulses.

⁴³ For points 4) and 5), see Schutz, "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur," pp. 114 f.

⁴⁴ A first attempt at dealing with this topic within the framework of Schutz's phenomenology is by Schutz's student, Maurice Natanson, "Philosophische Grundfragen der Psychiatrie I. Philosophic und Psychiatric," *Psychiatric der Gegenwart. Forschung und Praxis*, Vol. 1/2, 1963, pp. 903–925.

⁴⁵ Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§49 ff.

⁴⁶ The letter to Landsberg was not found among Schutz's papers by the editors. There is, however, a stenographic draft of a letter to Landsberg by Schutz dated 24 May, 1936 (pp. 13361–13362). Schutz's private library contains a copy of Landsberg's *Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie* of 1934 (1960) and the French translation of *Die Erfahrung des Todes* f 1936 (*Essai sur l'expérience de la mort* (1936)). [See Paul-Louis Landsberg, "The Experience of Death," in *Essays in Phenomenology*. Edited by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 193–232.] For Landsberg, see Eduard Zwierlein, *Die Idee einer philosophischen Anthropologie bei Paul Ludwig Landsberg*, Wtirzburg: Konighausen & Neumann, 1989. Paul Ludwig Landsberg (Bern, 3 December 1901–2 April, 1944) was arrested by the Gestapo in France in February, 1943, and died in the concentration camp at Oranienburg in 1944. See Herbert Mitgang, *The New Yorker*, 2 August, 1982, pp. 51ff. for an account of the death of Landsberg and his family by the Nazis.]

5) The basic psychological facts

my mood, my experiencing of the landscape, of nature, of music, but even perhaps my love for thee! Consequence: dual grounding of the ineffable in the strict sense

- a) *in the essentially actual and, therefore, unrepeatable nature of these experiencings,*
- b) *in the most personal nature of those experiencings limited just to me ipsum.*

[5/7069]

D) [On the most personal facts of consciousness related to the *alter ego*]⁴⁷

On the conscious experiencings directed to the *alter ego* that are nonetheless my most personal experiencings, yet that reveal the other as other:

1. Somatic: the child in the mother's love
 - my mother*
 - the sexual act*
2. Psychological: likewise those under 1), but correspondingly modified:
 - my childhood*
 - my having been born*
 - Eros as my most personal phenomenon revealing the alter ego, but, centered around thee: "Hand in Hand verpflichtet (Goethe, Brautigari)"*⁴⁸
3. Excursus on the problem of rhythm (as the most personal somatic experiencing and as part of my duration, the most original kind of effecting [*Wirkung*] in the external world but which is *always* oriented toward the *alter ego*—the phenomena that can be experienced growing old in common *with* the *alter ego*: from soldiers marching together to dancing together to making music together)⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Addition on the basis of the table of contents, p. II./7061.

⁴⁸ See the analysis of this example of "empathy" in Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1913), in *Gesammelte Werke* Bd. 7, edited by Manfred S. Frings, Bern/München: Francke, 1973, especially pp. 29 ff. (English translation, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath, with a General Introduction to Max Scheler's Work by W. Stark. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 18 f.). See Johann von Goethe, *Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe*, edited by Erich Trunz, Bd. I: *Gedichte und Epen I*, München: Beck 1981, p. 386: "Der Brautigen." Schutz's recourse to Scheler's argument is of particular significance here because he accepts intentional acts the "fulfillment" of which necessarily requires the existence of others. As a result Schutz clearly deviates from Husserl's interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity. See Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§43–50.

⁴⁹ See Schutz's later essay, "Making Music Together," (1951), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 159–178; (and the posthumously published "Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music" (1944), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, Edited by Helmut Wagner and George Psathas, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, Appendix, pp. 243–275.)

E) [Concerning the differentiation of my experiencings of thee, and of my social persons]⁵⁰

My experiencings of thee that reveal thee as *alter ego*, in contrast to those experiencings I impute to my social persons:

<i>alter ego</i>	<i>me ipsum</i>
1) Thy thoughts, even if appropriated by me, are not traced back to the <i>origo</i> , nor subtend the same attentional modifications, as do my <i>cogitationes</i> standing in the same meaning-context. And they are always revealed with the index, “not originally constituted.” They are continually accompanied by distinctly distinguishable experiences of appropriation belonging only to me.	What I think as <i>civis Romanus</i> I can trace back to self-presentive consciousness, and redistribute the attentional modifications of experiencings in my meaning-context into experiencings qua <i>pater familias</i> . They always have the index, “originarily constituted.” They are continually accompanied by the awareness, “and yet it was I who thought this.” [6/7070]
2) Our working together [<i>Wirken im Wir</i>] in the external world is accompanied by the memory of thy acting body, which does not tire me. Descartes’s racers out of breath ⁵¹	Accompanied by memory of my series of experiencings corresponding to <i>actio mea</i> that tire me. No somatic coincidence.
3) Our growing older together [<i>im Wir</i>] is constituted by thy presence in the surrounding world, incorporated into thy duration such that it can only be fulfilled after the general positing of the <i>alter ego</i> .	A quasi-working together [<i>im quasi-Wir</i>], never possible in simultaneity but always only in succession. Of which my body is distinctly distinguishable, as it originarily points back to my growing older in the distinctly separable duration that is mine. The “common growing older” of the social person of my <i>me ipsum</i> is the chief problem of II. Chief problem of II

F) As transition to <Chapter> II: Simile of counterpoint

The voices above the *cantus firmus*: separated and yet unified, apprehended horizontally and vertically, the ear listening forwards and backwards, the modifications of *idem sed non eodem modo*.

The possibility of variation, of repeats, of augmenting, of diminishing, of the canon; homogeneity of timbre makes it possible to hear overtones; the meaning of overtones (possibility that all tones are only overtones)

⁵⁰ Addition from the Table of Contents, p. II./7061.

⁵¹ The reference to Descartes cannot be directly traced in his work; but for a thematizing of bodily movement see *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641), Meditation VI; *Passions de l’Ame* (1649), art. 46; and *Principia philosophiae* (1644), Part II. It is possible that Schutz’s note is related to the succinct exposition of the Cartesian position and its critique in part to Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 189 f.

Simile of four-handed playing; to which instrument are we attuned? and which master takes us in hand?

O sweet song!

Weitlaubrunn 7/37/1936

[6a7071]

CHAPTER TWO

Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self.

A) The general positing of the *ego ipse* and its modifications in the natural world-view.

Whichever theory of the transcendental self be taken as point of departure (monads, the Kantian transcendental ego, Husserl's phenomenologizing self, Bergson's pure *durée*), all that we have within the natural world-view results from self-consciousness simpliciter and its development in the succession and co-existence of my experiencing *cogitationes*, *actiones* and indiscernible actual experiencings. In the natural world-view we do not ask about the subject of the *ego ipse* that self-reflective acts accomplish—it is simply the unity of self-consciousness taken for granted throughout all its positional acts, initiated as general positing. It follows that in the natural world-view just the *me ipsum* is meant by self-consciousness as Object [*Objekt*] to which reflective acts are related. To the extent that the *me ipsum* enters into the purview of reflection, it is (just now) the *me ipsum* past. The synthetic unity created by the *ego agens* seems dispersed as a result, and the *me ipsum*, shown continuously in *modo praeteriti* to the reflective regard, is presented at the same time as co-existence or co-succession of a series of partial-personalities [*Teilpersonalitäten*],⁵² i.e., of a *me ipsum* that bears a specific index. This aspect—the first *pros hemas*—is, however, only mere seeming [*Scheinen*] and must be examined with respect to its originary constituents. In actuality, the polythetic syntheses of the totality of my experiencings break down into monothetic perspectives, the origin and direction of which are founded in their respective *attention à la vie* of my Now and Thus. They are therefore pragmatically conditioned (even though indirectly and only in the commonly understood meaning).

⁵² *Teilpersonalitäten*, *Teilpersonen*, and similar locutions, are borrowed from Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 523 ff. (English translation, pp. 519 ff.). The English edition translates the locutions as “individual personalities,” “individual persons,” i.e., as individuations of a collective person. Thus we speak of the American personality, or the Hispanic personality, etc. Schutz, however, seems to depart from Scheler in this respect, although not inconsistent with Scheler, because he has in mind the “specific index” of the *me ipsum*, i.e., the solitary self with which he begins articulated into partial persons or selves such as my different persons or selves as parent, as businessman, as neighbor, etc. See above, pp. 1/7065 f. In Schutz's case it would appear misleading to speak of the individual personalities of the individual or individual *me ipsum*. Thus we translate the locutions as “partial personalities,” “partial person.” The *me ipsum* itself, the individual me myself, is then a collective whole of “personalities,” past and present, each with its partial content (*Teilhalt*), belonging to a collective whole in Scheler's sense.

How does this discrepancy between seeming and being come about? It is always owing to a confusion of the spheres of inquiry resulting from failure to correctly analyze the temporal structure.

- 1) The “schizophrenic” aspect, that the one and unitary self-consciousness splits up into more or less unconnected partial contents occurs when the self (*me ipsum*) as *phenomenon* is viewed as though it were a transcendental ego or an actual self naively and straightforwardly living in its *durée*. Thus it is the self living straightforwardly [6b7072] and naively in its durational stream in self-consciousness (thus prior to undertaking the reflective turn), that naively identifies with the *phenomenon* of the self and its partial contents which first become visible in reflection. Now, it is precisely the reflective act, directed *modo praeteriti* to the unitary self, that, by its refraction in the prism of the *attention à la vie* in question, first of all splits up self-consciousness—unified by virtue of the general positing—into the spectrum of *phenomena* of partial persons [*Teilpersonen*]. However, these phenomena acquire an uncanny life. They only exist *nomo*, but not *physei*.

Just so with the ideal type. Indeed, one can very well call this act one of self-typifying. Excursus: Leibnizian monads interpreted as ideal types posited by God. Above all, compare “Adam” in <Leibniz’s> first letter to Arnauld <of 4/14 July, 1686.>⁵³

- 2) The semblance of unfragmented unity arises when the self, instituted in the general positing of the *ego ipse*, proceeds from the experiencing of naively acting and by working in world-time without giving a thought to the fact that just this acting, as it were, collects in a concave mirror the colors of the spectrum fragmented in the prism of reflection. The actor qua actor (already formulated in the language of modifications) is subject, substance, monad, but never Object—as one possessing action carried out [*gehandelt Habender*], it would then be at the same time: as this and that possessor of action carried out [*gehandelt Habender*]. It is not *ego cogito ergo sum*, but instead (Leibniz in his critique of Descartes) a manifold of affairs thought by me, thus I am in a manifold of situations.⁵⁴

⁵³ In the original the indented passage is set off by double vertical lines. Schutz refers here to Max Weber’s conception of the ideal type, as developed in Weber’s “Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis” (1904) (in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen: Mohr, 1988, pp. 146–214). (English translation in Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Translated and Edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, 111: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 50–112). In the reference to Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld with the catchword, “Adam-problem,” Leibniz deals with his thesis “that the individual concept of each person once and for all includes all that the individual will ever encounter.”

⁵⁴ Leibniz, “Bemerkungen zum allgemeinen Teil der Kartesischen Prinzipien” (1692). Schutz paraphrases Leibniz’s statement in Article 7 where Leibniz says that “Man kann somit die primitiven Tatsachenwahrheiten passend auf folgende zwei zurückführen: ‘ich denke’ und ‘Mannigfaches wird von mir gedacht.’ Hieraus folgt nicht nur, [dass] ich existiere, sondern auch, dass ich auf mannigfache Art bestimmt bin.” [“We can reduce the primitively true facts to the following two: ‘I think’ and a ‘manifold of things are thought by me.’ As a result it follows not only that I exist but that I am defined in a manifold way.”]

In this connection, and particularly in both of the cases, a) and b), that it is a case of seeming and not of self-presentive constitution, is solely revealed by the circumstance that the partial contents as well as the (seeming) totality of acting from the start proves to be a modification of a unitary self-consciousness—an axiom that ought never be left out of sight. In the fullness of my manifold, I can view the manifold, thought by me, in an isolating way in monothetic rays, although it is just only a manifold that is thought by *me*. [6c7073]

- 3) One consequence of what we have previously said is the resolution of the problem of whether the partial contents must be regarded as co-existent or as co-successive. Even here it is a matter of a seeming (for the question crops up only in the domain of phenomena by temporal confusion). Every monothetic synthesis of polythetic acts brings along a certain idealization. Even the partial contents, shown to be modifications of a single self, stand under the ideality of “and so forth” and of “one can always again...”⁵⁵ Precisely that makes up its similarity with the ideal type. At the most it is thus a matter of potentialities preserving the semblance of co-existing realities by means of idealizations. After all, the proposition holds that the social person has no historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*], and that such historicity accrues exclusively to the person in its fullness (the monad). (More about this later on.)⁵⁶
- 4) Accordingly, the further development of the problem is clearly predesignated.
 - a) First of all, we have to investigate how, in the solitary self, the genesis of the phenomenon of the partial person is grounded in an original way:⁵⁷ two major headings are generated:
 - b) Problems of temporality:⁵⁸ to be investigated is the constitution of modifying intentionalities, thus above all of *attention à la vie* in its living variants.
 - i) with respect to their predesignated structure in the inner duration (the problem of growing older, of duration and world-time, etc. = genuine problems of constitution).
 - ii) with respect to the phenomena of memory (remembering, expecting, retention, protention = genuine problems of attention).
 - iii) with respect to the kinds of nascent tempora of the self and its perspectives (I am now, I am before, I am henceforth = the genuine phenomenology of the self in the natural world-view)

⁵⁵ See Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, §74.

⁵⁶ See below, pp. 7/7075 and 9/7077. Presumably Schutz refers here to Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)

⁵⁷ See Scheler's concept of person as bearer of a member of a personality <e.g., of a race, nation, religion,> *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)

⁵⁸ See below, pp. 7/7075 ff., following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, B and below, p. H./7061 the corresponding concluding outline of the contents of the manuscript of 1936, Chapter Two, B.

- c) Problems of pragmatic interpretation: or, of the constitution of attentional modifications themselves.⁵⁹
 - i) on the primacy of the acting self in the *setting in place* of the general positing.
 - ii) on the “self-typifying function” of hierarchies of plans (with excursus on <Felix> Kaufmann’s axiological consequence).⁶⁰
 - iii) on the pragmatic conditionedness of reflection
 - aa) in general
 - bb) its idealization (choice of monothetic perspective)
 - cc) its “*porte*”

[6d/7074]

- 5) Next we have to investigate how such kinds of constituting partial contents are presented in the natural world-view as a fully articulated hierarchy (the problem of continuity)⁶¹
 - a) from the anonymous [self] to the intimate person⁶²
 - b) what makes up the actuality of the social person in question in the solitary self?
 - c) constancy and changeableness of the actual social person in question
 - d) causes of dislocation (from becoming eccentric to now becoming central)
 - e) the experiencings of transformation [Verwandlung]: limit-situations and the moment.

Weitlaubrunn, 14 August, 1936

[7/7075]

B) Problems of temporality

I. The problems of constitution

Inner duration and world-time⁶³—growing older as being toward death—sinking into earlier life-forms—death as a solipsistic experience—the transcendence of life—growing up—specific situation of growing older: childhood, youth, growing up, old age—here the horizons are indicated by different measures of publicness.

The role of protentions that are not fulfilled for the constitution of apparent worlds—seeming and being—memorableness (reproducibleness)—fulfilled and unfulfilled horizons—situations—

⁵⁹ See below, pp. 1 I/7079ff following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, C, as well as the corresponding concluding outline for Chapter Two C, in the the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.

⁶⁰ See Felix Kaufmann, *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften* (Vienna: Springer 1936), pp. 191f, 306.

⁶¹ Following the thematic catalog to Chapter Two, D and E, below, pp. 21/7090 ff. as well as the corresponding outline to Chapter Two, D and E of the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.

⁶² In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 511, 548, 552. (English translation, pp. 506, 530 ff.)

⁶³ See Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 130 f., 180.

Excursus on the problem of generations: fathers and sons—

Intrusion of retentions in the transition from one personal world to another—

The *attention à la vie and fil conducteur* for the construction of personal worlds and as criterium for reality—Once again seeming and being: the relativity of the real—transcendence in immanence—

The stratification of temporality—tension of the *élan vital*—life during the day—life at night—the world of phantasy—working in the external world as the constituting specifics of the world of daily life—⁶⁴

The temporal structure of everyday life—the historically of the self in the first place as the history of its daily life—why the social person has no historicity in the genuine sense—the ideality of the immanent continuum—in contrast to the ideality of a unitary world-time—the compromise of public time as unifying moment—public time as solipsistically grounded in the rhythm of life (hunger, sleep, pulse, breathing, walking)—

Reciprocal relationship between the rhythm of the world (day—night, the seasons, tides—flood, moon, life of plants and animals) and solipsistic rhythm of life—

The pragmatic motive in the constituting of public time of everyday life—just on that account, however, a preformed type of personality corresponds to its persisting ideally in public time—[8/7076]—counter ideas: *homo religiosus*, particularly the mystic—but also the philosopher.

II. [The constituted immanence as constituting moment for the stratification of the social person]⁶⁵

The subjective experiencing of temporality as constituting immanence is itself again the constituting moment for the stratification of social persons.⁶⁶

The two basic experiencings: waiting (and, as correlate, expectation) and retrospect as the pole of tension: life—death, protention—reproduction, unfulfilled indecision—unchanging occurrence; the extent to which this tension is cancelled in

⁶⁴ For the whole section, see Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Chapter III, as well as *L'Énergie spirituelle* (1919) (English translation, *Mind-Energy*, by H. Wildon Carr, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). See in addition pp. 15/7084ff, below as well as Schutz's later development in his essay "On Multiple Realities," CP I, pp. 226 ff. For the reference presumably to Simmel's formulation, "transcendence in immanence," see below, fn, 71.

⁶⁵ Addition on the basis of the table of contents, above, p. II./7061.

⁶⁶ Here there is a further development of Schutz's basic thesis in *Sinnhaften Aufbau* that the constituting of meaning and actuality are essentially tied to the problem of temporality, that "the problem of meaning is a problem of time," p. 9; (English translation, p. 11). In this section Schutz develops the concepts of time as intersection of subjective and world time which, in part, he discusses in the continuation of the manuscript of 1937 (see below, pp. 43/7134 ff.). These analyses concerning the temporal stratification of social actuality will become relevant for Schutz in his later works—for, among others, the analysis of communication as temporal event—and continue into his American years. The conception of pragmatic temporality and the tempora of the self are here the most elaborated parts in his work; cf. *Sinnhafter Aufbau*, §7, and the additions in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, I, Chapter II, section B, 4; translated as *Structures of the Life-World* by Richard Zaner and Tristram Engelhardt (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

simply living along and annihilated in the ideality of public time—the role of pragma in this context—

The life-forms of *modo futuri exacti* and *modo plusquam perfecti* as projections of this state of affairs in which public time—expectation and memory already constituted as a unity—is guided by interest and attention—

The stratification of the social person into my self now, my self before now, my self later on (tempora of the self), and their perspectives.

III. The tempora of the self and their perspectival articulation.⁶⁷

a) My self now:

Characteristics of the Now as a controllable and foreseeable segment: the protentions are not empty and unfulfilled but are fulfilled with the maximum probability of *rebus sic stantibus*; moreover, the realization of the project can follow upon an extraordinarily small distance after the project; in this connection consciousness of the present resulting from

- i) constant somatic data (cf. Chapter 1, b)⁶⁸
- ii) essentially actual experiencings, to a lesser extent in the equilibrium of currently undifferentiated perceptions.
- iii) incorporation into the rhythm of public time

The pragmatic motive of the Now—the Moment in Plato and Kierkegaard (Concept of Dread [*Angst*])⁶⁹—also “Later” belongs together with Now, but not in the same sense as “Earlier,” from out of which the Now arises, apprehended from the extent of tension belonging to the project. [9/7077]

b) My earlier self (my self before now)

The pragmatic thrust to turn back is likewise requisite for *the portee* of the cone of rays of reproduction projected backwards—it seems that “my earlier self” is primarily given as my self *qua* social person, while “my self now” appears primarily as *ego ipse* in totality; thus in retrospect the unitary self today in the past is likewise split up into constituting partial persons: causes:

- i) only my self today lives in public time; still simply living in the stream, it enjoys somatic unity (old photographs)⁷⁰
- ii) only my self today *works*, my earlier self *has* worked; only *actio* creates a unity of relations, *acta* are not to be ascribed to the unitary *ego ipse* but instead to partial social persons; in fact we may say right away that such ascribed *acta* constitute partial persons precisely in their sedimentation.—

⁶⁷ In the continuation in the 1937 manuscript Schutz develops the following sketch into a first draft; see below, pp. 43/7134–67/7158.

⁶⁸ According to the concluding Table of Contents of the work on the manuscript in 1936 (above, p. II./7061), Schutz refers here to the section, “The Role of the Body.”

⁶⁹ For Plato, see *Parmenides* 155e–157b; for Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, Chapter 3 as well as *Either/Or* for the “leap” as the “moment of resolve;” and *Philosophical Fragments*, Chapters 1 and 4.

⁷⁰ Schutz is referring to the circumstance that, when grown up, only with great effort are we able to recognize our own bodies in our childhood photos.

By “ascription” we mean here reproduction in specific, pragmatically conditioned attentional modifications.

Perspectival articulation of my earlier self demonstrable at the center by levels or strata:

- i) my still surviving earlier self (the social person *realiter* always demonstrable in my self now)
- ii) my earlier self still *potentially* reactivatable (the social person “can always again” be brought into play)
- iii) the (dead) life-forms of my earlier self, definitively sunk into the past, which can never return and can no longer be reactivated.

Excursus on historicity [*Historizität*]:⁷¹

- a) lines of relevance (isographs) always drawn from Now and Thus,
- b) the variability of perspective, however, is limited to the levels i) [and] ii),
- iii) is unchangeable, would then be in the very developed past perfect relation (looking back at a past i) or ii) in which a past iii) was still effective that is now definitely dead).

—Continuous dying off of earlier selves as the criterion of growing older—this principle of irreversibility of time (duration)-receding identical with the durational cessation of partial dying—the problem of dread (Kierkegaard) and [10/7078] of “thrownness” (Heidegger) turn back to partial dying—the metaphysical origin of the idea of immortality, of the theory of *anamnesis* and of the journey of the soul.⁷²

Excursus on the unconscious (Freud)⁷³

- c) My self later on

The increasing indefinability makes possible the production of the future *ego ipse* and/or its partial persons—the future is articulated perspectively into the immediately foreseeable, diminishing up to the wholly uncalculable—the sort of relief, characteristic of the future, receives this landscape of the future by means of isohypses of relevance, introducing pragmatically conditioned attentional modifications—origin of the concept of probability and with it introduction of a new concept of possibility—the future falls under the ideality of “always again” and “and so forth” and to that extent refers back to the past or to an actual stock of experiences—constant probabilities (or risks) also belong to this ideality; e.g., con-

⁷¹ In the original the indented passage is set off by vertical lines.

⁷² See Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*; for the concept of “thrownness,” see Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§29, 31, 38, 58, 68b; for Plato see *Meno*, 8ldff., and *Phaedrus*, 74df.

⁷³ The indented reference is set off in the original by vertical lines. See Freud, *Das Unbewusste*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt/M: Fischer 1975), pp. 125–162. In *Sinnhafte Aufbau* Schutz refers in addition to Moritz Geiger, “Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität,” *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 4, 1921, pp. 1–136.

stancy of the probability of my physical death. —Here we also find the origin of the possible Ideological interpretation of one's own life (entelechy of monads) and point of insertion of the idea of transparency (in which my earlier self is the origin of the idea of the individual "law according to which you take your place").⁷⁴

[IV. The *ego agens* and the hierarchy of projects]⁷⁵

On the hierarchy of projects: life-plans, professional (work) plans, calculation, work and free time (work day and evening after work), yearly budget and weekly allowance, hourly plan, etc. Reactions to the fundamental dread: *carpe diem*, *ataraxia*, *espérance*.⁷⁶

Weitlaubrunn, July 28, 1936

[11/7079]

C) Problems of pragmatic interpretation

1) [The primacy of the acting self]⁷⁷

The pragmatic interpretation (of waking, rational acting which is always a "gearing into" ["*Behandeln*"] reality, to dreaming)

The delimitation of spheres of relevance as a function of *attention à la vie*—that is itself pragmatically conditioned—and, more particularly, predesignated in the hierarchy of plans—waking consciousness and sleeping consciousness—

Bergson's "tensions" as continuous adumbrating of waking consciousness—Leibniz's theory of partial sleeping (*Nouveau Essais*, I, 14, p. 74)—attention and memory: as the constituting of the *individuum* (*ibid.*, I 12, p. 73)⁷⁸—attention and protentions—the role of essentially actual experiencings and of indiscernible perceptions in the constitution of spheres of relevance—on their basis a new clarification of the difference between behavior and action—(*ibid.*, I, 15, p. 75)—the *continua* of *clara et distincta perception*:⁷⁹ confused perceptions, indiscernible perceptions in the equilibrium of perceptions, essentially actual experiences⁸⁰ (*verités de raison*: *lumen naturale*: instinct) have their correlate in the series: rational acting—acting without clearly distinct intermediate boundaries—behaving—simply living straightforwardly in the stream of duration.

Causes of the dominating role of the acting self:

⁷⁴ See Goethe, *Gedichte und Epen*, I, "Urwortes, p. 359: "Urworte. Orphische: Daimon, Dämon, Z, 1–4. "Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen. / Die sonne stand zum Grüße der Planeten./Bist alsobald und fort und fort gediehen. /Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten."

⁷⁵ Addition based on the table of contents, above p. II./7061.

⁷⁶ For the concept of "fundamental dread," see Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§40, 68b; for "*carpe diem*," see Horace, *Odes* (I, 11, 8). The attitude of "*ataraxia*" as a goal of life is at the center of the Stoic philosophy of Epicurus and Democritus.

⁷⁷ Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062. Schutz undertook a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937. See below, pp. 68/7159-74/7165).

⁷⁸ Schutz's references are to the French edition of *Nouveaux essais*, Paris, Flammarion. The references to Book I are erroneous.

⁷⁹ See Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, §§30 ff., 41 ff.

⁸⁰ See Leibniz, *Discours de Metaphysique* (1686), §33, as well as *Nouveaux essais*, I, 2, §21; I, 2, §20.

- a) *Physei*: Only action enters into world-time—experiencing of movement from within—making possible displacement of the *origo* of the system of coordinates in space and along with change of perspective from *hinc* to *illinc*—making possible the experience of resistance of external matter and therewith its constituting as *reality*⁸¹—together with distinguishing being from seeming—earlier unified self (motive)—my self now (*ego agens*)—my self arriving from the future (extent of the project)—to the center of action, the *ego ipse agens*—makes possible the hierarchy of plans—creates “veins in marble” that are “preinscribed” [*“vorpunktiert”*]⁸² and therefore create “pragmatic relevances”—constituting of habitualities and their automatisms.
- b) *Nomos*: motive and project rationally reconstructable by choice—arrangeable into categories of causes and goals—reality supposed as given and no longer a question of being and seeming—controllable as running its course in the external world—remains preserved in temporal variation, only the motive and extent of the project are adumbrated in experience, not however the *actio* itself—transformation of hypothesis of “psychophysical unity” into *thesis* about—⁸³
- 2) [Orientation of all other personalities around the *ego agens*]⁸⁴ Orientation of all other experiencings around those of the acting ego— continuation of this series within the acting ego by articulation of the levels of relevance
 - a) single projects of plans
 - b) in-order-to-motive
 - c) because-motive
 - d) choice of means
 - e) acting by choice (this occurs as much between particular articulated levels of relevance as within <relevances> themselves).

Weitlaubrunn, August 13, 1936

[12/7080]

3) Further investigations into the pragmatic principle

The surrounding world (but *not* the social surrounding world) articulated into perspectives of the Near and the Far (cf. In this connection Leibniz’s discussions of

⁸¹ In dealing with the pragmatic constitution of reality on the basis of the experience of resistance Schutz takes up an old pragmatic motive; see especially Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 151 ff. ; George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of Act* (1938), edited by Charles W. Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, Chapter III: “The Nature of Scientific Knowledge;” Max Scheler’s study of “*Erkenntnis und Arbeit*,” in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8: *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926), edited by Maria Scheler, Bern/ München: Francke, 1980, pp. 363 ff. (in connection with Dilthey). But also see Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, 11/4, §§ 1 ff.

⁸² For the metaphor of the marble, see Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, “Preface,” I, 1, §25; for the image of “preinscribed lines,” see Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 103 f. This image of preinscribed lines was used by Schutz since the time of his manuscript, “*Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*,” also see below, pp. 14/7083 f., as well as the elaboration of 1937, p. 73/7164.

⁸³ Schutz probably refers to Max Scheler’s observation in *Formalismus*, pp. 157 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff.), as well as pp. 381 f., 386 ff. (English translation, pp. 370 ff.).

⁸⁴ Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

spatial and temporal perspectives NE XXI, §62, p. 157).⁸⁵ Immediately a concrete real center of the surrounding world is given: things that lie in the range of vision, of hearing, of grasping, of reaching. The circuit of this circle is determined by the corporeality that constructs the *origo* of this system of coordinates.⁸⁶ It is to be noted that there are already differences here, e.g., in the sight world (with its optical perspectives) and in the world within reach. Except for the spontaneity included in all *cogitare*, a core of perceptual and apperceptual reality remains that does not yet presuppose on my part any “activity” in the sense of “grasping” in the external world, or of a “dealing with things” and therewith of an acting.

N.B. In this section we speak mainly of my unitary psychophysical *me ipsum*⁸⁷ as it is created by the general positing of action,⁸⁸ more particularly in the natural attitude. But by natural attitude we mean that I simply accept as facts the phenomena—including the phenomenon of *me ipsum*—and, as long as the harmony of experiencing does not disintegrate, that I do not distinguish between seeming and being. In a common sense we can say that also and just in the natural attitude a kind of *epoché*⁸⁹ is exercised which is certainly radically distinct in kind from the phenomenological *epoché*.⁹⁰

This *external psychophysical* passivity in which I receive perceptions from the core of reality of the surrounding world (I almost might have said, this passivity in which, in the very narrowest sense, perceptions from the surrounding world befall me), however, is transformed out of mere perceptions into apperceptions by internal activity (spontaneity). The particular experiences constituted polythetically are “well marked off in the monothetic ray of regard. They are brought into harmony with the current stock of experiences. Belonging to this stock of experiences, however, is the memory of all modifications that have been experienced in previous cores of reality through an act of pragma (e.g., mere kinaesthesias): this table now

⁸⁵ The reference is to Schutz’s French edition of *Nouveaux essais*, 11.21, no doubt to §63.

⁸⁶ See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§27 f. For the structural elements of time and space for the life-world, see Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, I, Chapter II, Part B.

⁸⁷ At issue here is the so-called psychophysical problem, thus the question of how the psychic (the soul) operates on the physical (the body), and conversely. So-called science by Gustav Theodor Fechner (*Elemente der Psychophysik*, Leipzig 1860, 1907, 1964) and developed by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig (*Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, Leipzig: Engelmann, 1874, 1908/11). See the contemporary literature familiar to Schutz, Ernst Mach, *Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis der Physischen zum Psychischen* (1900); Karl Jaspers, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* (1913); Robert Reininger, *Das psychophysische Problem* (1916), A. Wenzel, *Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Lichte der neueren Theorien der physischen und seelischen Wirklichkeit* (1933). Likewise see Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§44 f., 50 ff., 56.

⁸⁸ See above, p. 1/7065, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of my acting self.”

⁸⁹ See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§31 f.; *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§11, 15; *Krisis*, §§17 f.

⁹⁰ This is the first version of the *epoché* which is the specific *epoché* of “bracketing doubt” in the mundane, relative natural attitude; see the first draft in elaboration of 1937, below pp. 76/7 167f., as well as in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, p. 229.

looks like this and that. But when I stand on the other side, have gone around it, the table has a different set of looks. By virtue of the *pragmatic* idealization of “I can always again,” I can go around the table again (standing back from it). [13/7081] I can transform again the *hinc* into an *illinc* and the *illinc* into a *hinc*. Thus in a certain way the cores of reality have been displaced. What previously was the *core* of reality has now become the relatively peripheral reality. *However, by virtue of the pragmatic idealization of “I can always again,” all past reality has the characteristic of potentiality and, more particularly, is preserved in the specific form of probability.*

In the specific form of probability, because experience is underpinned by sub-rational [*sub-intelligierte*] *rebus sic stantibus* itself, the conclusiveness of which once again will be justified and corrected. There we find the probability-characteristic of probability [*Wahrscheinlichkeitscharakter der Chance*] that is calculable (not reckonable). I presume the repeatability, but by carrying out an idealization in consciousness that in such cases need not be legitimated to be in harmony with other experiences. Or, more precisely stated: that in every case and under all circumstances must become legitimated (since indeed *rebus sic stantibus* is only an idealization and we cannot step twice in the same stream) when proved after sufficient analysis and the living stream is not carried away by distinctions. In this context we have the great problem of repetition defined by Kierkegaard.⁹¹

Thus around the surrounding world’s core of reality in the strict and proper sense, a core of reality *ex praeterito*, a potentiality *ex praesente*, or, better, reality in the specific modification of probability. (E.g., the spatial perspective: “Let’s go over there and look at it more closely;” or “I’ll take off my dark glasses again;” or “I’ll come back after a year and convince myself”). Here it is already clear that the sedimented experience is a *pragma* (e.g., kinaesthesias) accomplished *by me*, in the memory of which this potentiality (reality in the mode of probability) proves to be an earlier core of reality: Once this *hinc*, now a “phenomenon of probability,” was a reality for me, but a reality *illinc*. For by my *pragma* my earlier *hinc* has now become an *illinc*.

Cf. Here and to this whole section the pragmatistic theory of perception that Scheler provides at the end of *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*.⁹²

[14/7083]

Now, contained in the idealization of “I always can again” there not only is the reiterableness of the same *pragma*, but also the realizableness of an analogous *pragma*. A second level of potentiality arises here, change in the broadest sense haloing the core of reality. Even though this level can still belong to the surrounding world it continually goes over into the contemporary world. I will travel to Pisa and see whether the tower is really leaning.

At this point the artificially abstract solipstic analyses arrive at difficulties because even the non-social contemporary world is founded on the social surrounding, contemporary and precedent worlds.

⁹¹ For the reference to Kierkegaard, see *Repetition*.

⁹² The reference is to Max Scheler, “*Erkenntnis und Arbeit*,” *loc. cit.*, pp. 359 ff.

If I climb up that hill, with more or less probability I will see the great clock.

The genuine pragmatic turn is completed when Leibniz defines spontaneity in connection with striving to acquire other perceptions.⁹³ To acquire other perceptions means displacing the *origo* of my system of coordinates or to alter the actual core of reality of my surrounding world precisely by means of a pragma such as change of place: some phenomena or other by change brought “within reach” in a “potential surrounding world.” Because my pragma is, however, continually operative, I am never in an indifferent state where everything is of equal weight. Instead I am continuously shaken by the onslaught of confused perceptions that are indiscernible which Leibniz compared with the noise of waves breaking on the beach. In Bergson’s lingo these are just those experiences that define the tensions of my *attention*⁹⁴ (perchance even make them up), and that provide the first division of my surrounding world into its perspectives by just this pragma. My “attention” (i.e., the confused perceptions in their totality) link my regard to the “predelineated lines” (Bergson), to the “veins in the marble” (Leibniz), while they make “salient” those perceptions out of the breaking waves of confused, “unconscious” perceptions, namely <those that are> apperceived (and possibly raised to more distinct clarity in the optimal case: in-order-to-motives of a rational action)—perceptions that are pragmatically relevant for me, *ego ipse agens* (that I act upon and institute together with the general positing of my unitary world as well as the unity of my self)- To that extent, the pragmatic conception is well grounded.⁹⁵

Concerning the whole foregoing problem of the core of reality, we have to observe that this articulation into perspectives is not only spatial but also temporal and, in general, is to be carried out with respect to situations.

Weitlaubrunn, August 16, 1936

[15/7084]

- 4) The pragmatic principle as constituent of forms of personality conceived of as co-existing or co-succeeding.
 - a) [Primacy of the purely actual pragma and the full reality constituted by it]⁹⁶

Primacy of the purely actual pragma and the full reality of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach constituted by it: to which corresponds full *attention à la vie*—

⁹³ See Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, II, 21, §§9 and 72, as well as *Essais de Théodicée*, I, §§59,65, and III, §§290, 301.

⁹⁴ See Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 89 ff.

⁹⁵ The references are, again, to Schutz’s French edition of *Nouveaux essais*. For the whole development of the relation of Bergson and Leibniz, see Schutz, “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” *CP* II, pp. 85 ff. Cf. Leibniz’s theory of choice in acting (NE, pp. 130, 136 f., 138, 143 f., 147, 148, 152, 158 as well as 165 f.) with Bergson’s theory of choice in *Données immédiates de la conscience* (“Decisions fall like ripe fruit”).

⁹⁶ Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III/7062. In the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937, Schutz developed a first draft of this section. See below, pp. 75/7166-87/7178.

This level gives evidence of open horizons, and particularly of a) levels of the first potentiality: the previously actual pragma that potentially is reiterable; the full reality of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach corresponds to the world of “phenomena of probability.” The *attention à la vie*, limited to my self now in the purely actual pragma, is extended to my self later on, however always related back to my previous self. Protentions procure their intentionalities from reproductions and retentions of pragmas that have receded into the past, b) Levels of the second potentiality: potential pragma—yet always stemming from the level of the *ego ipse*—the boundaries of which lie only in the compatibility and compossibility of the in-order-to motives, of the projects, of specific relations of ends or means with the whole experience, especially with respect to the experience of one’s own pragma, its practicability and “its own powers.” The reality of the surrounding world leads to the potentiality of the contemporary world, the world in the extent of its reach corresponds to the world in its reachableness.

Correspondingly, change grows out of the receding probability, the experience of risk, and thus directs *attention* to my self later on, freed from that reference back to my earlier self. Specific, basic attitudes result: courage, fear, awe, ataraxia, etc. Protentions are simply there and are completely unfulfilled.

N.B. Even here our analysis carried out in the solipsistic primordial sphere necessarily remains fragmentary. Significant levels of potentiality of one’s own pragmas are lacking, the analogue of an “of thee,” of the third person [*von dritten*], of anyone, of everyone are already accomplished. What thou (he, that one, one, whoever) can do, I can also. In this connection, the highly anonymous typical action for one’s own pragma is at most only probable, and thus prefigured as a very individually related action: *one* does thus and so; thou certainly, in your own special capacities... What one can do, I can also do, <but> in no case can I measure up to thee. The series of pragmatic anonymity flows in inverse relation to the theoretical with respect to “probability” (law of the paralogism of anonymous probability, basic for the problem of the orientation of social persons around the intimate person and to be more precisely considered there).

A.S. The sphere previously dealt with may be comprised under the heading of “*the world of working*.”⁹⁷ Its perspectival relevance-articulation is investigated in this connection on the basis of the pragmatic motive.

[16/7085]

[b)] Modifications of the world of working by variations in *attention à la vie*.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Here, for the first time, Schutz introduces the concept of the “world of working” [*Wirkwelt*]. For exposition of the world of working as the core of the life-world, see “On Multiple Realities” as well as the relevant passages in “Symbol, Reality and Society.” Both of these essays are reprinted in *Collected Papers* 1.

⁹⁸ Schutz develops a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below, pp. 88/7179-118/7210. For the examples of modifications into the worlds of phantasy, dream, and science, Schutz investigates the different cognitive styles central to the constitution of “multiple realities.” See the development of modifications of the world of working in “On Multiple Realities.” The present section lays the groundwork for this analysis of the modifications of the worlds of phantasy, dream, and scientific theory.

[1]] Preface⁹⁹

No matter how the pragma, the *actio*, may refer to the prephantasied *acta modo futuri exacti* (i.e., founded on the project), and accordingly, on the other hand, to the whole stock of experience, the world of working is designated by the fact that, genetically explained, these moments are of great significance but that, together with the pragma, the “fiat” constitutes the unity of the self in the general positing of working in the world. The *project* finds its correlate in the purpose: the *purpose* contains the intending to the “fiat,” just as the *project* contains the intending to the *goal of action*. Thus the pragma is articulated as follows: a) the pragma without the purpose and project: mere reaction, mere behavior determined by indiscernible, confused sensations; b) the pragma with the purpose but without the project: affective behavior, traditional behavior, “empirical” behavior in the sense of Leibniz;¹⁰⁰ c) the pragma with the project and purpose: acting with distinctly intermediate goals: rational acting and d) the pragma with the project but without the purpose: phantasms (in any case, the project itself belongs here).¹⁰¹

In the following we speak of d)

[2]] The World of Phantasy.¹⁰²

Presupposition: Changing the tension of *attention à la vie* so that it is no longer directed to my self later on and to the potentiality of the surrounding world of the second level, but directed to the self as such (not *beyond* my time but to my self—in the *apparition* [*apparition*] of Now and Thus—continually posited, to my self all the time as well as to the potentiality of my self from now on). Afterwards a perspectival division of the world of phantasy also arises here depending on whether the compatibilities and compossibilities of “real” daily life are retained or whether they are “bracketed” level by level. End point: limitless (?) free will. Of course the world of phantasy knows projects with hierarchies of plans, but without the apertinent hierarchies of purposes. “Choice” and “election” [*Kür*] are themselves shown there, but not “will” and “free will” because as such no voluntary act with the intentionality of “fiat” has its own place there. The “reality,” transposed from the world of working, may in part or even wholly remain preserved. In a certain way “probability” is a “*conditio potestativa*.” As such, “potestativity” [*Potestativitat*]¹⁰³ is an essential of the world of phantasy in which—in the limiting case—the degrees of freedom of variation = infinity.

⁹⁹ From the table of contents, above, p. III./7062.

¹⁰⁰ See Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, II, 1, §15; II, 21, §§72f; II, 22, §§10 f.; also *Théodicée*, §§290 ff., 323, 403.

¹⁰¹ In this connection, see the development of 1937, below, pp. 71/7162f, as well as the systematization of this typology of acting in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, II, C.

¹⁰² Here Schutz follows Husserl and Scheler for whom, even in different contexts, phantasy is a capacity of consciousness to be able to adopt different attitudes to a posited object; for Husserl see *Ideen*, I, §§97f; for Scheler, “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” pp. 313 ff., 343 ff.

¹⁰³ *Conditio potestativus*, the condition of having power or authority, a condition within the power or authority of the self in the world of phantasy. The word, “potestativity,” is not in the OED.

We may say with Leibniz that those confused sensations that are indiscernibly contained in all future sensations can always be fully developed, fully unfolded in the world of phantasy and, so to speak, feigned as clear and distinct.¹⁰⁴

Weitlaubrunn, 18 August, 1936

[17/7086]

A further criterion of the world of phantasy is liberation from the “*adequatio rei et intellectus*”¹⁰⁵ or from the harmony of experience. Not once within the different phantasy-experiences need harmony reign. Nevertheless, the laws of incompatibility produced by *logical* impossibilities¹⁰⁶ also hold for the world of phantasy, but not because of incompatibilities stemming from *factual* impossibility. I may be able to phantasy a *perpetuum mobile* (or a centaur), but not a decahedron—in that case I have to remain in an intuitively blind nomenclature just as I do in waking life.—It would seem that irreversibility of time also belongs to logical incompatibilities—although all other temporal moments can be cancelled in the world of phantasy. We can phantasy the magnification and acceleration of time, the reversal of motion (as in the comic film of swimmers jumping on a trampoline¹⁰⁷), but not the reversibility of time itself. Even while phantasying and dreaming, I grow older. In this connection, of particular interest is how the phantasma of myself nevertheless always contains all moments of the *durée*.

All of these investigations are preeminently important for the problem of listening to a piece of music “forwards” or “backwards”, and for the foundation of a theory of musical form of artists and listeners. In addition, they provide a new basis for the theory of the “unconscious,” of the “Id.”¹⁰⁸ (N.B. Even the reversibility remains contained if the object of phantasying flows in the manner of the pluperfect, which must still necessarily lead to the proximity of the present.)

Within the worlds of phantasy we can produce different kinds of the world of phantasy a) according to the adherence to functions of one’s own body, b) according to the orientation of the *alter ego* transposed into the world of phantasy—i) according to the *alter ego*’s corporeality, ii) to the *alter ego*’s social function, iii) according to the the ego’s cooperation in legitimating and justifying the *alter ego*’s own experiencings of phantasma. We can phantasy alone, as in day dreams (or in dreams as such), but also collectively as in the case of children at play, or masses in religious ecstasy, etc. There is the Don Quijote type, or the Eulenspiegel type—the former a visionary [*Phantast*] facing realities, the latter a realist facing

¹⁰⁴ See Leibniz, *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondees en Raison*, §13; and *Monadologie*, §§22 ff.

¹⁰⁵ An allusion to the definition of the concept of truth by Aquinas; see *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, *Quaestio XVI*, *Art V*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Schutz has *Inkompatibilitäten*, but we believe he means *Inkompossibilitäten*, and have accordingly so translated it.

¹⁰⁷ The reference cannot be identified.

¹⁰⁸ See Freud, *Das Unbewusste*, loc. cit.; and *Das Ich und das Es*, in *Gesammelte Schriften. Studienausgabe*, Vol. III, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1969, pp. 282 ff.

a phantasma.¹⁰⁹ The world of poetry as much as the world of the drunkard belongs to the world of phantasy. Especially the structure of the world of jokes.¹¹⁰

[18/7087]

[3)] The dream world

Complete release of the tension of *attention à la vie* to which as such I am directed in the modification of my previous self. By no means freedom from perceptions, rather however freedom from apperceptions (in the world of phantasy in the genuine sense there is apperception, except that the interpretational schema is radically changed). Perfect and pluperfect experiencings are suggested, while *indiscernibilia* are made distinct, empty protentions filled, horizons laid out, anticipations “made past” [“*perfektisiert*”] and reproductions “made future” [“*futurisiert*”]. The categories of impossibility and of incompatibility are no longer valid. However—viewed subjectively—irreversibility is still preserved here. Only when you wake do you have the semblance of a reversibility while remembering. This conception would seem to be in extensive agreement with Freud’s interpretation of dreams. Psychoanalysis as the transformation formula of the dream-world and the waking-world.¹¹¹

Characteristics of the dream world: Lack of potestateness. In default of apperceptions, there is obviously no speaking of *adequatio*. To a certain extent, in the world of dreams sedimented experiencings are unbound and reconstructed. The project is not potestative—although there are quasi-plans and quasi-hierarchies from pre-given sediments related to them—but the dreaming self would seem to act without purpose, without a voluntary “fiat.” With respect to semblance, dream-events are detached from all constituents in the *durée*—but only with respect to semblance: In actuality, mere severance from the (public) lifetime. Important: reproduction of dreaming: is it possible without change (self-interpretation) and how? A far-reaching difference seems to have taken place between retention and reproduction.

Dreaming is essentially solitary. If *alter egos* arise in the dream world they appear necessarily typified even when they seem to stand in the most intimate of relations in the surrounding world. There are *alter egos* by my grace. One cannot dream together; with their mirroring of the universe, the monad is in fact without windows even when it dreams.¹¹² The *alter ego* is always an object as subject of the world of dreams.

[19/7088]

[4)] The theoretical world of contemplative observation.

At the outset we have to note that even reflective (theorizing) acts are actions, but, so to speak, pragma-free actions. They are not bound to working in the external world. The *attention à la vie* thus experiences its own kind of modification such that the pre-given world is not governed as a world of work but instead should be recognized

¹⁰⁹ Schutz returns to this image in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP* I, pp 236f; in this connection, see also his “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” *CP* II, pp. 139 f.

¹¹⁰ See the material on the theme of “Witz” (Wit, Jokes) in Schutz’s *Nachlass*, microfilm 5, Division XLVI, no. 7036–7053.

¹¹¹ See Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

¹¹² For this image, see Leibniz, *Monadology*, §7.

as a theoretical world. Nevertheless the theoretical cosmos is a *universum* because even the world of working is wholly contained in it, except not as an object of volition. The theorizing self is conceived as detached from all realities other than its intentional acts, this being the true sense of the *epoché* (or “disinterestedness”).¹¹³

The temporal structure in its full extent, the living self with all its modifications, as my self now, before and later on, still obtain. Furthermore, consciousness of my own body, even of my own world of working, though only as a potentiality, still obtain. The working self is always only an object for theoretical observation, just as the flow of consciousness of the working self is an object of theoretical consciousness.

The single voluntary act of the theorizing self in which it is a subject in the genuine sense, is—as project—setting the problem, the purpose of which is tackling the solution of the problem. But even this is not working in the external world but pure analysis of findings already there.

The incompatibilities and impossibilities still wholly obtain without restriction, as does the irreversibility of time. However, in place of the pragmatic relevances we have theoretical interests=problems impartially selected by the theoretician from the pregiven cosmos. The degrees of freedom of possible variations are thus extremely limited so that we cannot speak of potestativeness, and the *adequatio* is rationally demonstrated step by step. Even here the confusion of indiscernibles remains a datum, the postulate still holds of explication by thinking clearly and distinctly so far as possible. That holds as well for the concept of the confused and indiscernible (the ineffable in the strict sense). E.g., the theoretician naturally is familiar with all the protentions and anticipations of the working self in their totality, with all of their omissions and chances of fulfillment, but he has no interest whatever whether they are fulfilled or not. As such, the theoretician is never in dread, nor courageous or ataraxic. The theoretician grows older—always “*qua*” theoretician—only to the extent that he changes his experiential purpose and new intentionalities [20/7089] are constituted and sedimented.

The relation to the *alter ego* develops in an entirely distinct way for the theoretician. Disregarding the fact that social life in its fullness obviously is an object for theoretical observation, the constitution of the *alter ego* in <my> self remains a theoretical problem. But even the theoretical world pregiven to me is thine and our world, and straightaway you are concerned to justify and account for my experiencing. Accordingly others are given in the theoretical world who can theorize at the same time and together with me, and about the same thing. The wonder of *sympphilosophiein* remains the ultimate inclusion of full humanity in the theoretical world.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ See above, p. 12/7080.

¹¹⁴ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX, 12, 1172a. The idea that even science is an intersubjective system of knowledge within the life-world is formulated explicitly by Schutz for the first time in the present manuscript. See the almost identical concluding paragraph in “On Multiple Realities.” It is possible that Schutz adopted the formulation here from Husserl’s letter of 3 May, 1932. There Husserl thanks Schutz for the copy of *Sinnhafte Aufbau* Schutz sent him, and invites Schutz to visit him in Freiburg: “Kommen Sie also, ich werde mich für Sie frei machen. Es soll ein schön’s *sympphilosophiein* werden.” See *Husserliana Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 483.

[c) Summary]

Obviously we emphasize the fact that the divisions into worlds of working, of phantasy, of dreams and of theory is a solely constructive and typifying one, certainly not a taxonomical, descriptive one. We also emphasize that there are innumerable intermediate strata and that here as everywhere the law of continuity holds. Later on we shall provide more precise accounts of the problem of co-existence and (co-) succession of these “worlds” or basic attitudes. Similarly, we must emphasize more precisely why the world of working must be chosen as the archetype (on account of the general positing).

Weitlaubrun, 19 August, 1936

[21/7090]

D. Central and peripheral levels of the person.

- 1) The self as subject standing out from the different forms of the self as phenomenon.¹¹⁵ The self as monad and entelechy—active proceeding to always new perceptions—spontaneous in the capacity to apperceive new perceptions—thinking many things but still not oneself thinking in many different situations—*multiplicem aut simplicem se sentiens* (Augustine, *Soliloquia*, II, 1; cf. Leibniz’s commentary, note 304)¹¹⁶—

Leibniz’s theory of self-apperception (NEII, 27 §9 ff., pp. 187–189)¹¹⁷—

Kantian counter thesis—Fichte—Schelling—Hegel—¹¹⁸

Husserl’s phenomenological reduction—the transcendental Ego—the primordial self—the phenomenologizing self.¹¹⁹

Simmel’s transcendence in immanence—Scheler’s theory of life-spheres—Freud’s Ego, Superego, and Id—¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ For earlier formulations of this problem, to which Schutz has recourse, see especially Kant’s distinction between the “self as subject of thinking” and “the self as object of perception,” in *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798), I, §7.

¹¹⁶ See Augustine, *Soliloquia*, II, 1. The reference to Leibniz is to *Nouveaux essais*, IV, 2, §1, note 304, which cites the relevant passage in Augustine. Schutz had already cited this reference to Augustine (though mistakenly to the *Confessiones*) in his manuscript, “Lebensformung und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 93 f.

¹¹⁷ The references to *Nouveaux essais* are, again, to the French edition used by Schutz.

¹¹⁸ Among the works to which Schutz may be referring are Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87); Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794); Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797), and *System der transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800); Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807).

¹¹⁹ Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, Meditations IV, V.

¹²⁰ Schutz refers here directly to Simmel’s typification [*Typik*] of the “male gender” in its “dual relationship” as the “continuous reaching over and beyond itself [*beständigen “Ober-sich-selbst-Hinausgreifen”*]. See Simmel, “Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem,” in *Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays* (1911), reprinted in Simmel, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 14: *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie: Philosophische Kultur*, edited by Rüdiger, Kramme/Otthein Rammstedt, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1966, pp. 219 ff. More particularly, Schutz refers to a formulation found only in the first edition of this volume (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911). There, at the conclusion of the exposition of the “indifference” of women to “proving <an argument>” [*gegen das Beweisen*], Simmel says that “the one refusal shows the immanent, the other the transcendent, formation of the female gender. Very schematically, and contrasting the object with

Heidegger's anthropological-ontogenetic principle¹²¹—Kierkegaard's stages—Jaspers' contributions to the problem.¹²²

2) The theory of the intimate person

- a) The intimate and the ineffable—the role of essentially actual experiencings—experiencings that are not memorially continuous [*nicht erinnerungsbestandige Erlebnisse*]*—essentially indiscernible and confused experiencings—Bergson's conception of duration as pure reality— Kierkegaard's concept of dread—the addressee of the “appel du heros”— Heidegger's thrownness and care—(from the pure durée to plants endowed with memory to the perceptibility of animals and apperception of human beings).*¹²³
- b) What intimacy as such may be in the solitary self—absolute intimacy—that each is the most distant and yet the closest¹²⁴—relative intimacy in social life—
- c) The intimate person as regulative of valuings—*joie et plaisir*—the meaning of the doctrine of *eudaimonia*—attitudes towards one's own valuings—Nietzsche on Epicurus¹²⁵—new clarifications of acts of choosing on the part of the intimate person—but together with new clarifications of acts as such—and instituting hierarchies of plans—(infinite regress of motivations also belongs in this context).
- d) the anthropological-characterological side of the problem— the true meaning of spirit as the antagonist of the soul—instinct in Leibniz and Bergson¹²⁶—Plato's attempt to solve the problem of the theory of *anamnesis*¹²⁷—the *verites*

the male gender as such most emphatically, we may formulate <the dual formation> by saying that its immanence is its transcendence.” The editors are indebted to Angela Rammstedt for this reference. See as well Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 155 ff., 287 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff., 275 f.), and for Freud, *Das Ich und das Es*. Last but not least we find the concept of “immanent transcendence” in Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*.

¹²¹ Here Schutz interprets Heidegger's analyses neither as fundamental ontology, nor as existential philosophy. Instead he interprets Heidegger in philosophical-anthropological terms, i.e., as a contribution to the investigation into the structures and constitutive relationships of the *conditio humana*.

¹²² Kierkegaard distinguishes the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of human existence in *Either/Or*, and again in *Stages on Life's Way*. In the case of Jaspers, Schutz is referring to his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919), Berlin: Springer,³ 1925.

¹²³ The references are to Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 105 ff.; *Creative Evolution*, pp. 106 ff.; and for Bergson's general concept of reality, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 56ff, 144 ff.; to Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, and to Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (e.g., §§29, 38 ff., 57 f., 63 ff.).

¹²⁴ An allusion to Nietzsche's saying in the Preface to *The Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor Book: Garden City, New York, 1956, p. 149, that “we remain strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must mistake ourselves; for us the axiom, ‘we are each of us farthest from ourselves, we are no “knowers” of ourselves,’ will hold for all eternity.”

¹²⁵ For Nietzsche's observations on Epicurus, see *Human, All Too Human*, II.

¹²⁶ See Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*; Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 133, 174 f.

¹²⁷ See Plato, *Meno* 81dff; *Phaedo*, 74dff.

*innees*¹²⁸—applied psychologically: drive and disposition—“mood” as the form of expression of the intimate person—music’s relation to it—feelings of sympathy—emotions as such—the naive and sentimental human being¹²⁹—the attitude of the religious—the emergence of the mystic as the metaphysical form of the intimate—intimacy and solipsism.

Excursus about the problem of fate and freedom, explained in Goethe’s “*Urworten*.”¹³⁰

[22/7091]

3) The neighboring levels of the intimate person:

- a) The vital spheres. Phenomena of pain—sensations of desire—so-called sensualistic data—Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony—Bergson’s matter and memory—efforts toward a basic psycho-physical law—attitude toward the vital sphere.¹³¹
- b) Sexuality. Kierkegaard’s theory of sexuality—Diotima’s polemic against Aristophanes—Schopenhauer’s critique.¹³²

4) The *ego cogitans* and the *ego agens*.

Their dependence on the intimate person—related to the previous problem of setting their goals—above all, of their purposes—the principle of indiscernibility and the *principium individuationis* as expression of this set of affairs in Leibniz.¹³³

5) The incorporation of the external world.

Adaptation of this—the body as work-utensil for seizing space—subordination to temporal and spatial perspectives—overcoming the resistance of matter, the incorporation of space into the world of working, into cosmic and public time, having to wait—the expenditure of energy to reach a goal, the reference to work-utensil and utensil (thing-in-order-to), in short: the orientation toward *data*, finding givennesses and structures that do not stem from me, myself, but instead are pregiven from without,

¹²⁸ Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, I, 2, §§1-10; 1,3, §§18 f.

¹²⁹ For Heidegger, see *Sein und Zeit*, §§29 f., 40; for Scheler, see *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 29 ff. [English translation, pp. 14 ff.]; for Schiller, see *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1795), in *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, Bd XX: *Philosophische Schriften*, Erster Teil, edited by Benno von Wiese/Helmut Koopmann. Weimar: Böhlau, 1962, pp. 413–503.

¹³⁰ For Goethe, see *Gedichte und Epen*, I, *loc. cit.*, pp. 359 f.

¹³¹ For Leibniz, see *Theodicy*, *loc. cit.*; for Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, *loc. cit.*; for Fechner, see *Elemente der Psychophysik*, *loc. cit.*. The concept of the vital sphere refers to Scheler’s distinction between the vital and spiritual spheres and their respective values; see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 123 ff. (English translation, pp. 103 ff.); and *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 83 ff. (English translation, pp. 72 ff.).

¹³² For Kierkegaard’s discussion of the sensual-eroticism in terms of the figure of Don Juan, see *Either/Or*; the reference to Diotima is to Plato, *Symposium* (201dff., 206bff); for Schopenhauer, see *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. II, Chapter 44. In this connection, see also Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 120 f. (English translation, pp. 113 ff.).

¹³³ See Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, II, 27, §§1ff.; *Discours de Metaphysique*, §9.

forcing on me an attitude along with an *attention à la vie* coming from the things themselves but not from the sources of my *durée*, from my intimate person, and that are, so to speak, imposed upon me. Here we see the primacy of the whole pragma together with the conditioned interpretation itself for the phenomena of the central-peripheral articulation of the levels of the person.

Further development is relatively simple: The goals set define the essentially necessary means to reach them along with their beginning—the choice of means as well as of goals necessarily must be improved, more comfortably formed—legitimated purposes, rationale, define my interests and my *attention à la vie*—working back to the intimate levels—interdependence of goals and means—working back to acts of valuing and preferring—all of these attitudes, however, are not developed by me alone (with a certain latitude for variation dependent on my personal “inclinations”), but also by thee and everyone else who cares to achieve a like result in this world. [23/7092] It therefore follows that my attitudes become always less specifically colored by my self, that they always become more typical the more they accommodate those of everyone else, or, so to speak, become always more anonymous. At all levels we find a continuous transition from the absolutely intimate person to the highest anonymous behavior which, as it were, continues the tension: highest anonymous contemporary world—the embodied Thou having the surrounding world itself within the boundaries of one’s own self; all of this works back again to the central levels:

- a) because this is observed through the medium of the newly acquired typifying experiencings
- b) because goals reached influence goals set
- c) because the *attention à la vie* is fundamentally modified (for living in the world presupposes a minimum of “tension”).
- d) because turning toward the most intimate spheres themselves only “occurs” within the highest life-planes. (Problems of censorship and displacement find their clarification here)

All of this leads to a *self-typification* of the self.¹³⁴

- 6) Full development of the processes of anonymization (depersonalization) in the social world.¹³⁵
 - a) Here we begin by carrying forward the results from the “*Sinnhafte Aufbau*”¹³⁶ with respect to increasing anonymization (emptiness of content) and typification.

¹³⁴ A reference to the mechanism of typification and self-typification used by Schutz in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* to describe the constitution of stocks of knowledge in common.

¹³⁵ The theoretical part about the process of anonymity has two sources in Schutz: the one source is Bergson’s thesis of the person as the inauthentic cinematographic gestalt of the self in *Time and Free Will*, pp. 128 f. the other is Scheler’s development of the difference between the intimate and the social person in *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 544 f.); and *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, Chapter C.

¹³⁶ See *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §§36 ff., especially §38.

- b) We will assume that supplementary typification enters because it is not I alone who carry out my own self-chosen plans in the world of working, but because I am working together with others and against others, also caring and setting goals not just for myself but also for others (family to humanity).
- c) We shall develop further the additional modification to *all* lower levels up to the intimate person, accrued by being in the social world
- d) Incorporation of experience of someone else, above all of equitable purposes
- e) Variation through language, etc.
- f) The law of the paralogism of anonymous probability (p. 15[/7084]) as point of departure for further considerations

Weitlaubrunn, 20 August, 1936

[24/7093]

E. Actualities of the levels of personality and their variations

1. [Active and passive attention as the actuality of the phenomena constituting the levels of personality]¹³⁷

The distribution of the indiscernible perceptions by attention makes up the actuality of the levels of person in question. The concept of attention is equivocal. There is the concept of attention springing from full activity, a being-directed of the act of *cogitare* to a certain in-order-to, but also to the distinct grasping of the interdependences, on the one hand, of this in-order-to with the means requisite to bringing it about, on the other hand with other systems of means and goals of action. This kind of conscious attention is essential for the constituting of the purpose (not so much for the project that arises from a so-called passive “interruption” [“*Einfall*”] and itself can only be a because-motive for the in-order-to of paying attention). In its spontaneous activity this “paying attention to” is itself a *cogitare* with precise, demonstrable intentionalities. It is however *constitutionally* the secondary (note: in the succession of the *histoire des nos découverts*; Leibniz NE pp. 359/60),¹³⁸ and is separated from the case of a primary “attention” included in the concept of the Bergsonian *attention à la vie* to which correspond the correlative tensions of consciousness. In activity is we most often sense this as the passive underground of attention (approaching the *pros hemas*), as the because-motive for the in-order-to motive of paying attention¹³⁹ (e.g.. I will deal with this theme and direct my attention to thinking the complex through in the minutest detail. I pay attention with full effort of will. Why? Because I am interested. “Passive” attention most often offers itself as “interest” of interpretation.) The constitution of this *seemingly* passive attention has already been clarified on p. 15[/7084]. It gives rise to the confused,

¹³⁷ Addition from Table of Contents, p. III./7062.

¹³⁸ The reference, again, is to Schutz’s edition of the *Nouveaux Essais*; cf. IV, 7, §8.

¹³⁹ This issue here, consequently, concerns the problem of the “intrinsic” relevance by virtue of the pragma in contradistinction to the type of relevance “imposed.” The unity of both constitutes the social person for Schutz. Cf. Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, reprinted in *Collected Papers* 5.

indiscernible experiencings that, in their totality, call forth “involuntary choice” while sorting out the pragmatically relevant experience from the confused, indiscernible experiences, i.e., making them distinct or going from perceptions to apperceptions. Here there is a new application of the pragmatic principle or, more precisely stated: the derivation of the results produced above, p. 22/7091) from a different set of problems.

2) [“Secularization” of attention in daily life.]¹⁴⁰

A “secularization” of attention, so to speak, happens in daily life in so far as the attitudes of the *attention à la vie* are themselves rationalized and distributed into the hierarchy of plans: days for working and evenings for leisure, life during the day and life at night, etc., etc. hours for eating and for prayer. Not just the passive because-motive but also the active in-order-to motive of paying attention then appear as “taken for granted.” What the hierarchy of plans constitute in the first place appears to be incorporated in it. This is because practical hierarchies of plans arise with the claim of comprehending the totality of existence and the universality of all forms of personality, even though paradoxically themselves being only the consequence [25/7094] of a special attitude toward life (*attention à la vie*). It is then that the pragmatic origin of this “situation of interest” becomes almost completely hidden, and what itself stems from a pragma only seems to be the occasion and origin of new pragmata. The roles of habitualities also have to be investigated.¹⁴¹

3) [Constancy and change of *attention à la vie* (phenomena of transition). Origin of morality]¹⁴²

If we consider the situation in its original fullness, then we see that the basic attitude of *attention à la vie* in the solitary self (later we shall have to speak of its deviations conditioned by sociality) successively increasingly makes visible the very different levels of the person in so far as they are not more or less rationalized, habitualized. It can be that *attention à la vie* is fixed on peripheral levels—this is the rule even in the case of vivaciously busy people in Goethe’s sense.¹⁴³ But whatever experiences can be, whether attitudes are now secularized or not, the bearing of attention immediately rules otherwise and brings about a reversal. The experiences provoking the reversal, however, are not in the secularized sphere such that stem from the intimate person (dread before death, insight into the irreversibility of duration, doubt of the effectiveness of the pragma (not being within our power).) The *effect* [*Effekt*], i.e., which attitude presumed in the first place is for the moment indifferent (examples: Thomas Buddenbrook reads Schopenhauer, “dem Taumel weih’ich mich”, etc., the religious turn, the “leap” in Kierkegaard—especially interesting

¹⁴⁰ Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

¹⁴¹ Schutz’s reference library contains a copy of Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien, *De l’habitude* (1838), Paris: Alcan, 1933.

¹⁴² Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

¹⁴³ See especially Goethe, *Faust*, Act II: Laboratorium, lines 6885 ff.; *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, Chapter 6.

in *Repetition* is the transformation of the erotic person into Job, etc.).¹⁴⁴ In the secularized sphere attentional attitudes, however, themselves are objects of purposes and projects and distributed into the hierarchies of plans: “tomorrow is another day of work,” etc.

Through will, sociality, habituality, education (in a double sense) and culture an interdependence of “*attentions*” à la vie is formed, itself almost a hierarchy. <We find> here the “source of morality and religion” (Bergson), the cause of the “discontents of civilization” (Freud) and the polemical object of the “will to power.”¹⁴⁵ But also the foundation of Goethe’s ethics of the “demands of the day.”¹⁴⁶

As such there appears here the setting of a problem with which we must deal in order to enter into all “ethics which will be able to come forth as science.”¹⁴⁷

Obviously conflicts arise: typical case, “Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” etc.¹⁴⁸

We can speak of becoming eccentric¹⁴⁹ from the levels of personality that until now were central. But even here, again, the potentialities of the first and second order (whether, namely, previously central levels that have now become eccentric can become central again or devolve into “partial death). This latter problem is especially important for defining the pathological.

[26/7095]

4) [Conflicts of Interest and their resolution]¹⁵⁰

Such conflicts are, in part consciously decided, in part defined by the *indiscernibilia*. Pyschopathology offers a variety of especially instructive material, particularly the sexual-pathological studies, because they concern, of course, habitualities, but a domain not accessible to rationalizations.¹⁵¹ Very important: experiences of

¹⁴⁴ Thomas Mann, *Buddenbrooks. Verfall einer Familie* (1922), Part 10, Chapter 5; Kierkegaard, *Repetition*. Schutz refers here to accelerating hope of Constantine Constantius to engage a higher power through the reading of the Book of Job so as to bring about a change in order that the relation to the beloved might still succeed.

¹⁴⁵ Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality* (1932); Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930); Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (1901).

¹⁴⁶ Goethe, *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (“Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages.”) There is an identical formulation in *Maximen und Reflexionen*, no. 1088.

¹⁴⁷ The allusion is to Kant’s *Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science*.

¹⁴⁸ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, ii, 2.

¹⁴⁹ Schutz refers to the category of “eccentricity” central to the philosophical anthropology of Helmut Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1928). (For an elaboration of Schutz’s thought in terms of Plessner’s category of becoming, see Fred Kersten, *Galileo and the “Invention” of Opera*, pp. 14 ff.).

¹⁵⁰ Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

¹⁵¹ Schutz may be referring to the work of Otto Schwarz, *Sexualpathologie*, Wien/Leipzig/Bern: Wiedmann, 1935. A copy of this volume is found in Schutz’s private library, bearing a dedication from the year 1935 so that Schutz may have been familiar with the book at the time of writing this manuscript.

religious conversion: Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Strindberg.¹⁵² Particularly to be investigated: the experience of the “leap” and of the “moment” in Kierkegaard, and the “limit situations” strikingly described by Jaspers.¹⁵³ Also cf. the attempts at a solution in the Romantics, especially Novalis. Examples from the biography of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer. On the attempts to centralize heterogenous levels of personality, instructive information in Rathenau, Schleich and Schweitzer.¹⁵⁴

5) [Application of this mode of observation to the problems of general culture and its history]¹⁵⁵

It would appear that this mode of observation can be applied to the whole of cultural content, indeed to historically given cultures themselves. Thus the task is set of explicating the implied *attention à la vie* which gives rise to the Renaissance, or to the cultural circle of Buddhism, or to the Gothic peoples, or to the polyphony of the Netherlands, or to the work of Giorgione, as well as to the political thinking of the Romantics and to the economic theory of liberalism.

F) [Summary of the results of the foregoing investigation]

The summary follows of the results achieved in the second chapter (Genesis of the Social Person in the solitary self) [in sections] A to E.

Weitlaubrunn, 22 August, 1936.

[7096]

¹⁵² See Augustine, *Confessions*, Book IX; Pascal, *Pensées*; Kierkegaard, *Fear And Trembling*, Part IV; *Philosophical Fragments and Stages on Life's Way*; Strindberg, *Son of a Servant*, *Inferno*, *To Damascus*.

¹⁵³ With respect to books in his private library, Schutz no doubt studied the analysis of “limit situations” as found in Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Chapter III; cf. also *Philosophie* Vol. 2, Chapter 7.

¹⁵⁴ For Walter Rathenau, *Zur Mechanik des Geistes* (1913), Berlin: Fischer¹⁸, 1921; Carl Ludwig Schleich, *Van der Seele. Essays* (1910), Berlin: Fischer,¹⁴ 1922, especially the essay about “Schlaf und Traum,” as well as *Das Problem des Todes*, Berlin: Rowohlt, 1921; for Albert Schweitzer, two volumes are found in Schutz's private library: *Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur. Kulturphilosophie. Erster Teil*, Mtluchen: Beck, 1923, and *Aus meinem Leben und Denken*, Leipzig: Meiner, 1932 (now in *Gesammelte Werke in fünf Bänden*, edited by Rudolfs Grabs, München: Beck, 1974, in volumes 2 and 1 respectively).

¹⁵⁵ Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.